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Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014

Comprehensive report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen*, **

Summary

In this report, the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts highlights incidents and patterns of conduct since September 2014, including those between September 2014 and June 2019 not covered in previous reports (A/HRC/39/43 and A/HRC/42/17), and incidents and patterns between July 2019 and June 2020 in the context of the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis.

The Group of Experts finds that the parties to the conflict continue to show no regard for international law or the lives, dignity, and rights of people in Yemen, while third states have helped to perpetuate the conflict by continuing to supply the parties with weapons.

* Agreement was reached to publish the present report after the standard publication date owing to circumstances beyond the submitter's controls.

** The annexes to the present report are circulated as received, in the language of submission only.

I. Introduction

1. In resolution 42/2, the Human Rights Council renewed the mandate of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts a further year to, *inter alia*, monitor and report on the situation of human rights in Yemen and to carry out comprehensive investigations into all alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law and all alleged violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties to the conflict since September 2014, including possible gender dimensions of such violations, to establish the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged violations and abuses and, where possible, to identify those responsible

2. The Council requested the Group to present a written report to the Human Rights Council at its forty-fifth session. In December 2019, the High Commissioner reappointed Kamel Jendoubi (Tunisia) (Chair) and Melissa Parke (Australia) and appointed Ardi Imseis (Canada) to replace Charles Garraway (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

II. Methodology

3. During this mandate period, the Group of Experts prioritised investigations of alleged violations occurring between July 2019 and June 2020, though taking a longer temporal scope for some categories of violations not fully addressed during its previous mandates.[1] Violations were selected for examination according to the criteria previously outlined by the Group, including the gravity of allegations. Given the ongoing nature of the conflict, the Group's findings account for only a fraction of the violations committed in Yemen since September 2014 and should not be construed as suggesting that other violations did not occur.

4. In addition to highlighting State/institutional responsibilities, where possible the Group of Experts has identified individual alleged perpetrators, and prepared a strictly confidential list for submission to the High Commissioner for Human Rights.[2]

5. In reaching factual conclusions that underpin its legal findings on violations, the Group has applied the same standard of proof as in previous mandate periods, i.e. the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard. It has also adopted methodologies aimed at ensuring the safety and security of victims and witnesses.

6. The Group relied on a wide range of sources. After assessing their reliability and credibility, it required: either at least one credible direct source of information, independently corroborated by one or more additional credible sources of information; or, in cases where there was only a single credible direct source for an incident, showing it fitted or revealed a pattern established by the Group for similar incidents. It conducted over 400 interviews with victims, witnesses and other individuals and reviewed a significant number of documents, open-source material, and additional secondary sources. In February 2020, the Group also issued an online call for submissions

7. The Group of Experts faced a series of challenges and limitations. The Group regretted that for a second consecutive year, it was not able to access Yemen and other coalition countries despite repeated requests. Following its previous practice, in June 2020, the Group also addressed requests for submissions to the Government of Yemen, the de facto authorities,[3] the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab

[1] A conference room paper containing the detailed findings of the Group of Experts (A/HRC/45/CRP/7) is available on its webpage at: www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/YemenGEE/Pages/Index.aspx

[2] This list is distinct from the Mapping of Main Actors contained in Annex I.

[3] The term "de facto authorities" is used only to refer to the authorities based in Sana'a, where Ansar Allah as a political movement is the main actor, supported by an armed group referred to as the "Houthis." The Group uses "STC" to refer to the Southern Transitional Council operating in Aden and southern governorates, notwithstanding that during part of the reporting period, the STC acted as a de facto authority.

Emirates, and Sudan, and reviewed the comments received from some parties[4] on findings the Group outlined in its previous report (A/HRC/42/17). Additional limitations arose from the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions, which impeded victims' and witness' access to safe spaces for interviews with investigators. The Group and its Beirut-based Secretariat were compelled to curtail field missions, and substantially alter their working methods. As a result, the Group had to narrow the breadth of matters investigated. Moreover, the 4 August explosion in Beirut caused minor injuries to some personnel, and dislocation and property damage to others, interrupting and delaying the work of the Secretariat.

8. The Group remains concerned about the climate of fear in Yemen deterring victims, witnesses and organisations from engaging and sharing information. In the case of specific violations such as gender-based violence and child recruitment, the difficulties are compounded for survivors by societal stigma, risk of marginalisation or reprisals from family and the wider community.

9. The Group of Experts once again expresses its deepest gratitude to those who shared their experiences and for the assistance provided by government and non-governmental entities and by United Nations agencies and partners.

III. Legal framework

10. In its investigations, the Group of Experts has applied international human rights law (IHRL), international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL).

11. The Government of Yemen has ratified seven of the nine core international human rights treaties and has obligations with respect to the whole of the territory of Yemen.[5] Where de facto authorities are in control of territory and exercising government-like functions, they are also bound by international human rights norms. Other States operating in Yemen must also abide by their extra-territorial human rights obligations. While IHRL applies at all times, during armed conflict its application may be affected by IHL as the *lex specialis*.

12. Yemen continues to experience a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis, to which Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, and relevant customary IHL, apply. All parties to the conflict, including members of the coalition supporting the Government of Yemen, are bound by these norms, in addition to obligations under other treaties they have ratified. The legal framework governing NIACs applies equally to other NIACs occurring in Yemen, between the Government of Yemen and other non-State armed groups, and among different armed groups.

13. Although the Group of Experts is not a criminal adjudicative body, ICL has been taken into account for the purpose of considering whether violations amounting to international crimes may have been committed in Yemen, given the Group's mandate regarding accountability.

IV. Military, political and humanitarian context (July 2019 – June 2020)

14. After six unremitting years of armed conflict in Yemen, the multi-party war continues with no end in sight for the suffering millions caught in its grip. Whether through ongoing airstrikes, the crippling blockade, indiscriminate artillery attacks, impeding humanitarian relief supplies and access to food and healthcare, harm from landmines, arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearances, widespread displacement, assaults on civil society and

[4] The Government of Yemen (35th Armored Brigade), the de facto authorities, the STC, the coalition and the United Arab Emirates submitted observations to the previous report.

[5] Yemen has ratified the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CERD, CAT, CRPD and the CRC. It has ratified additional instruments including the OP-CRC-AC.

minorities, recruitment and use of children, gender-based violence, and endemic impunity, Yemen remains a tortured land, with its people ravaged in ways that should shock the conscience of humanity.

15. It has been reported that, since the beginning of the conflict, approximately 112,000 people have died as a direct result of hostilities, of whom around 12,000 were civilians.[6] The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented at least 7,825 civilians killed (including at least 2,138 children and 933 women) and 12,416 civilians injured (including 2,898 children and 1,395 women) as a direct result of the armed conflict between March 2015 (when it began such tracking) and June 2020. These figures do not include the many thousands of people who have died as a result of the worsening socio-economic, health and humanitarian conditions.[7]

16. Very limited progress was made in reaching a political solution to the conflict despite efforts led by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Yemen. Further implementation of the Stockholm Agreement remained stalled. Hostilities continued in Aden, Abyan, Shabwah, Al-Bayda, Ta'izz, Al-Hudaydah, and Socotra, and erupted on new fronts in Sa'ada, Hajjah, Sana'a, Al-Jawf, Ma'rib, and Al-Dhale'e.

17. Among the main military developments, the second half of 2019 saw the United Arab Emirates withdraw most of its ground troops, leaving a minimal presence in Al Mukha, Aden, Balhaf, Al-Mukalla, and Socotra. The United Arab Emirates has, however, continued its air operations, and some 90,000 UAE-backed Yemeni fighters remain on the ground in Yemen. Sudan withdrew several thousand troops from the coalition.

18. Tensions in Aden increased in August 2019. By 10 August, Aden had fallen under the control of the STC. On 22 August fighting broke out in Ataq City, Shabwah governorate, between Shabwah Elite Forces affiliated with the STC and the Government of Yemen armed forces. On 28 August, fighting intensified in Abyan. On 28 and 29 August, the United Arab Emirates launched air strikes in Aden and Zingibar which it claimed were against 'terrorist' groups, while the Government of Yemen claimed the attacks targeted its regular forces. On 25 April 2020, Aidaroos Al-Zubaidi, President of the STC, declared a state of emergency in Aden and the creation of a self-ruled administration in the regions under its control. In May, a significant military confrontation in Zingibar intensified. On 22 June the two parties agreed to a ceasefire. In Socotra, however, the security situation has remained volatile. By 20 June, STC affiliated forces had seized control of Socotra, and the Group remains concerned about the fate of this world heritage protected area.

19. From August 2019 onwards, the Houthis launched military operations in Sa'ada Governorate. At the end of January 2020, Houthi forces captured the Fardhat Nihm area and by the end of February, Al-Jawf's capital, Al Hazm, had fallen as well. The Houthi forces continued their offensive in Al-Jawf, and by April controlled most of Khabb wa ash Sha'af district, which borders Saudi Arabia. The military confrontations on these fronts and hostilities in Ma'rib led to other fronts being activated, including Al-Bayda.

20. Political developments included the Riyadh Agreement of 5 November 2019 between the Government of Yemen and the STC calling, inter alia, for the formation of a new government. The agreement was short-lived, however, with the STC withdrawing from it on 25 August 2020. Informal talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis also started in September 2019. In response to the risk associated with COVID-19, in March 2020 the United Nations Secretary-General called for a global ceasefire. While the coalition declared a unilateral ceasefire in April, it was not followed by an end to hostilities.

[6] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Resources: War in Yemen, available at https://acleddata.com/2020/03/25/acled-resources-war-in-yemen

[7] It was projected that, as at the end of 2019, over 130,000 people would have died as a result of the worsening socio-economic, health and humanitarian conditions: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen, 23 April 2019, available at: https://www.undp.org/content/dam/yemen/General/Docs/ImpactOfWarOnDevelopmentInYemen.pdf

21. Access restrictions imposed by the parties on humanitarian agencies and on food, medicine and fuel supplies, the further deterioration or destruction of water, sanitation and health infrastructure, flooding, locusts, the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, non-payment of salaries, currency depreciation, and donor fatigue, all further exacerbated the world's worst humanitarian crisis. According to OCHA, nearly 80% of the population remain in need of humanitarian aid and protection. WFP estimates that over 20 million people are food insecure, with malnutrition disproportionately affecting marginalized and at-risk groups. Over 3.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Yemen, most of them women and children, face acute vulnerabilities, including 1.5 million in the Ma'rib Governorate alone, who lack access to adequate health care, food, water, housing, and education.

22. The COVID-19 outbreak has occurred when barely half the health facilities in Yemen are functional. Facilities that are operational are underequipped to cope with the disease. Additional constraints include the compromised immunity of many within the community due to malnutrition; successive infectious disease outbreaks, such as cholera, dengue and Chikungunya virus, and the particular vulnerability of specific groups due to displacement and poor access to sanitation services (e.g. IDPs, migrants and refugees). Added to this are the gravely inadequate measures adopted by the Government of Yemen, de facto authorities and the STC, poor data collection and reported attempts to conceal information regarding infection rates. The Group of Experts has repeatedly called for the release of detainees, who are at increased risk of infection.

23. The current lack of funding for international humanitarian aid compounds this situation. The High-Level Pledging Event held in Riyadh in June 2020 saw donors pledge only US$1.35 billion of $2.41 billion needed to cover essential humanitarian activities between June and December 2020. This gap is even more concerning, as, according to OCHA, since mid-April, 31 of 41 United Nations programmes critical to fighting COVID-19 have reduced or closed for lack of funding.

24. In July 2020, the Houthis reportedly sent a letter approving the deployment of a UN technical team to assess the Safer oil tanker, located off the coast of Ras Isa terminal in the Red Sea, amid renewed warnings from the United Nations of an environmental catastrophe in the event of a spill.

25. Notwithstanding the strong recommendations by the Group of Experts in its previous reports, third States, including Canada, France, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, continued their support of parties to the conflict including through arms transfers, thereby helping to perpetuate the conflict.

V. Findings on violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law

A. Attacks affecting civilians or civilian objects

1. Coalition airstrikes

26. In its first two years, the Group of Experts analysed a number of coalition airstrikes given the apparently disproportionate impact of such airstrikes on civilians. It raised concerns with coalition processes for target selection and execution of airstrikes, and noted a consistent pattern of harm to civilians. During this reporting period, the Group verified a further four airstrikes or series of airstrikes involving similar failures to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian objects.

27. For example, the Group examined three airstrikes launched in the Al-Sawamel region, Mustaba district, Hajjah Governorate on 11 August 2019. Shortly after 8 a.m. the first strike hit a house. Ten minutes later the second strike hit a location approximately 150m away from the house. Some 4 to 5 minutes later, the third strike struck an open area far from the village and did not cause damage to persons or property. While the Group of Experts was unable to verify exact casualties, the next day the Office of the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian

Coordinator for Yemen reported that 12 persons were killed, including 6 children, and 16 civilians injured. Most casualties belonged to an IDP family who had fled their place of origin in Haradh district, Hajjah Governorate in 2015. No statement was made by the coalition in relation to this attack, and the Group is not aware of any military targets among either the persons or objects impacted, or in the immediate vicinity.

28. Another example is the series of airstrikes launched on 31 August 2019 on Dhamar Community College, in Dhamar Governorate. One of its buildings was being used by the Houthis as an unofficial detention facility, holding mostly civilian male detainees. The existence of this detention facility was publicly known since at least 2018, having been referred to by the United Nations Panel of Experts. As a result of the strikes, at least 134 male detainees were killed and 40 injured. Four buildings (including the detention facility) were severely damaged and one building was totally destroyed. The coalition justified this airstrike as an attack on a legitimate military target.

29. The coalition's Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) investigated the incident, concluding that the Community College was used to store drones and air defence missiles, and that Houthi military vehicles had been observed at the location. JIAT also referred to the detention facility not being on the "no-strike list". The Group of Experts has not been able to independently verify claims regarding military use of some buildings or the presence of military equipment. However, even if this were the case, the presence of military targets does not negate the coalition's legal obligation to take account of the likely civilian impact of attacks, undertake necessary proportionality analyses and ensure sufficient precautions in attack. It rejects the coalition's implicit attempts to deflect legal responsibility through reference to the "no-strike" list, noting that the OCHA deconfliction mechanism relates only to static humanitarian locations and humanitarian movements in Yemen. Non-inclusion of any facility on the list cannot be used as a justification for the coalition's failure to comply with its fundamental IHL obligations.

30. The Group documented two further airstrikes resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties, especially children. On 24 September 2019, at 8.30 a.m., in Al Muzaimir village, Al Fakhir town, Al-Dhale'e Governorate, over 30 civilians were killed and injured by two airstrikes. One of the deadliest airstrikes of 2020 was launched by the coalition in the early hours of 15 February 2020 on a village in Al-Hayjah Area, Al Maslub District, Al-Jawf Governorate, resulting in approximately 50 civilians killed and injured.

31. In these and other airstrikes documented, the Group concludes that the coalition may have failed to take all necessary measures to minimize civilian casualties. Failures relate particularly to fulfilling duties to verify a target as a legitimate military target, to collect and assess intelligence relating to likely civilian impact and to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a lawful one or that it would be a disproportionate attack. Even if it were confirmed that the coalition were directing attacks against legitimate military targets in some of these airstrikes, the extent of civilian casualties that could have been anticipated raises significant questions as to the proportionality of the attacks and whether all feasible precautions in attack were taken. Disproportionate attacks constitute war crimes under customary international law.

2. Mortar/Rocket shelling

32. The Group of Experts remains concerned at the continued practice of parties to the conflict of using indirect-fire weapon systems with wide-area impact, such as rockets and mortars, especially in populated areas. Given the imprecision of such weaponry, their usage in such environments gives rise to the likelihood of significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian buildings in excess of any anticipated military advantage, and increases the risks of misdirected attacks.

33. For example, on 5 April 2020, at approximately 4.30 p.m., several mortar rounds, fired by the Houthis, hit the Central Prison in the north-west of Ta'izz city. One round killed 6 women (5 inmates, 1 guard) and two girls, and injured 6 women, in the female section of the prison. Some of the women killed and injured had been due to be released the next day as part of an effort to ease the prison population amid concerns over COVID-19. The prison is located in the middle of a residential area, adjacent to what is commonly known as the

"social welfare compound". The 17th Brigade of the Ta'izz Axis Command of the Yemeni Armed Forces had been using this social welfare compound as an administrative headquarters. Analysis of the impact crater and blast radius indicate the mortars were fired from a northerly direction, reportedly controlled by the Houthis.

34. In another series of incidents, the "Al Raqw market" in the Monabbih district of Sa'ada Governorate was hit by three mortar shell attacks. The Group verified that the latest such incident occurred on 24 December 2019, when at least two mortar shells landed on the market. The Group established that at least two shells fell on the market on 20 November 2019 and it is still investigating a reported third attack on 27 November, as well as the number of victims of each attack. This market is understood to be an informal hub and transit centre for Yemenis, Ethiopians and Somalis, and a key location for cross-border smuggling activities into Saudi Arabia. According to the Office of the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, at least 89 civilian casualties, including migrants, resulted from this series of attacks. JIAT acknowledged only the December incident, claiming coalition Land Forces were responding to armed elements firing at them from a location 90m from the market. JIAT added it was likely that one of the mortar shells landed on the market due to a technical failure or changing weather conditions. The Group received evidence contradicting this explanation.

35. The Group of Experts found reasonable grounds to believe that such incidents amount to indiscriminate attacks prohibited under IHL: being either attacks not directed at a specific military objective, and/or attacks involving a means of warfare not capable of being directed at a specific military objective. Indiscriminate attacks constitute a war crime under customary international law. Such incidents also reflect a failure to take all feasible precautions to minimize civilian casualties under IHL.

3. Attacks affecting hospitals

36. Among the civilian objects damaged by indiscriminate rocket shelling have been hospitals and medical facilities. Damage to such critical infrastructure has the effect of exacerbating the already grave humanitarian crisis by further reducing access to health care.

37. For instance, the Group investigated damage inflicted on the Al Jafrah General Hospital and the Al Saudi Field Hospital in Majzar District, Ma'rib Governorate, by rocket shelling, allegedly by the Houthis. On 7 February 2020, at around 6pm, a Katyusha rocket exploded in the yard of Al Jafrah Hospital, resulting in extensive damage to the building and the wounding of one male paramedic. Most medical services were interrupted and hundreds of patients were transferred to Ma'rib General Hospital. At dawn the next day, two Katyusha rockets hit the Al Saudi Field Hospital, a mobile clinic adjacent to Al Jafrah Hospital, damaging the facility. The facilities were located in an area controlled at the time by the Yemeni Armed Forces, though eye witnesses recounted that there was no military presence inside or around either hospital. Since 15 June, Houthi forces have occupied both facilities and converted them into military barracks. This increases the risk they may be attacked in the future and deprives Ma'rib's population, mainly comprised of IDPs, of access to health care at these facilities.

38. The Group of Experts does not have sufficient information to conclude that these attacks were directed at the hospitals. The Group found reasonable grounds to believe, however, that these attacks were at a minimum prohibited indiscriminate attacks due to the imprecise nature or deployment of the weapons used. Further investigations are required to confirm the party responsible for these attacks.

4. Landmines

39. The Group of Experts has previously investigated the unlawful use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines in Yemen. In this reporting period, the Group continued to investigate deaths and injuries directly attributable to anti-personnel landmines planted earlier in the conflict by the Houthis in violation of IHL.

40. On 19 June 2019, for instance, a 15 year-old girl herding sheep in the area of Al-Khasja village, Tur Al Bahah district, Lahj Governorate, was killed when she stepped on an anti-personnel mine. On 8 January 2020, a 12 year-old boy herding cattle in the area of Al

Ribi village, Qa'atabah district, Al-Dhale'e governorate, was significantly injured when he stepped on an anti-personnel mine.

B. Arbitrary deprivation of life/murder of civilians

41. The loss of life brought about by attacks violating IHL also represents a violation of IHRL's prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life. However, even away from the battlefield, individuals continue to be killed unlawfully at the hands of parties to the conflict. During this reporting period, the Group of Experts investigated six incidents, revealing a pattern of unlawful uses of lethal force by security or law enforcement actors.

42. On 7 June 2019, for instance, members of the Security Belt Forces shot dead five men and injured six men during Friday prayers at the mosque in Mathad village, Al Azariq district, Al-Dhale'e Governorate, after accusing the worshippers of being affiliated to the Houthis.

43. In early January 2020, Government of Yemen Special Security Forces converted a secondary school near Al Khubar village, Habban district, Shabwah Governorate, into military barracks. On 1 February, dozens of students demonstrated against the requisition of their school. In response, Government of Yemen Special Security Forces, referred to by witnesses as 'al-Islah militants', raided Al Khubar, searching for the students and arrested two boys aged 14 and 16 years, detaining them on the basis of their alleged affiliation with the STC-affiliated Shabwah Elite Forces. Later, when a group of civilian men from the village approached the school to negotiate their release, members of the Special Security Forces guarding the facility opened fire with AK-47s, killing two men from the group.

44. On 6 April 2020, a 19-year-old male student was driving home with his female colleague. Two armed men, allegedly from STC forces, stopped the car at a checkpoint in Al Mualla district, in front of the Coral Hotel, Aden Governorate. After checking the man's identification, they asked him to hand over his phone. When he refused, the armed men shot him dead.

45. The Group of Experts found reasonable grounds to believe that such killings amount to arbitrary deprivation of life under IHRL and, depending on the level of nexus with the conflict, may also amount to murder under IHL and war crimes.

C. Violations related to the humanitarian situation

46. Rather than being the incidental result of hostilities, the continuous deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Yemen is directly attributable to the conduct of the parties to the conflict. In its previous reports, the Group of Experts has documented the disproportionate effects on the civilian population of the de facto blockade and access restrictions, including the closure of Sana'a airport, imposed by the coalition and Government of Yemen.

47. The parties to the conflict also contributed to the worsening humanitarian situation through the manner in which they conducted military operations, and the failure, particularly by the Houthis, to properly facilitate access to humanitarian relief. Certain actions by the parties have diminished the population's capacity to access basic necessities, for example, the irregular payment or non-payment of salaries for most civil servants since 2016. Many Yemenis interviewed by the Group noted that even when food, water, medicine and fuel were available, they were prohibitively expensive.

1. Attacks affecting objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population

48. The Group continued to investigate a series of attacks impacting the Red Sea Mills ('Mills') in Al-Hudaydah. As a major wheat storage and processing site, the significance of the Mills as a source of humanitarian relief increased during the reporting period as food insecurity worsened.

49. Between August and October 2018, when the Mills were controlled by Houthi forces, mortar shelling allegedly by Government of Yemen armed forces led to some shells landing inside and around the Mills compound. Mines and improvised explosive devices were allegedly planted by Houthi forces inside compound warehouses and yards. The most severe shelling happened in December 2018 and January 2019, with one incident reportedly causing serious damage by fire to one silo. The most recent attacks, allegedly by the Houthis, occurred on 18, 19, and 20 May 2020, damaging the production line and parts of the silos, resulting in the Mills not functioning for more than ten days. The various attacks on the Mills not only affected the functioning of the site, but also impacted the distribution of food aid as they contained – before hostilities started in Al-Hudaydah – a quarter of WFP's in-country stock, access to which was halted several times. Before the conflict the Mills contained an estimated 51,000 metric tons, enough wheat to feed 3.7 million people for one month. Other reported attacks affecting WFP food storage and distribution facilities require further investigation.

50. On 16 December 2018, a coalition airstrike struck a water tanker transporting fresh water for a village and crops in the Al Wahbyia area, As Sawadiyah district, Al-Bayda Governorate, in a rural area with no known military targets nearby.

51. Despite most damage to the Mills being caused by military operations and further investigations being needed to establish the circumstances of other attacks on WFP facilities and the water tanker, the Group of Experts considers that, in a situation of such acute food insecurity, the conduct of the parties displays a reckless disregard for the impact of their operations on the civilian population and access to food.

2. The impact of mines on access to food

52. The Group found that the use of mines has exacerbated food insecurity. In 2018 a sea mine explosion killed three fishers from Al-Ghowaireq village, At Tuhayat district, Al-Hudaydah. Landmines have prevented fishers reaching coastal areas to fish, in particular in Al-Hudaydah, where mines riddle coastal roads and instill fear. This has affected the availability and market price of fish. The presence of landmines has also made many farmers afraid to farm their lands, or herd or graze their livestock. The deployment of mines has made struggling fishing and rural communities even poorer.

3. Interference in humanitarian aid

53. The Group of Experts documented a range of conduct by parties to the conflict amounting to impeding humanitarian relief supplies in violation of international norms, either by unduly restricting access or by engaging in practices that undermine the ability of humanitarian organizations to carry out their work.

54. In addition to the case documented last year, where the Group found that no legitimate justification existed for the Houthis to deny WFP access to the Mills between January and May 2019, the Group examined reports of burdensome requirements imposed by the Houthis on humanitarian agencies in relation to permits, access, management, and operations. While parties to a conflict are entitled to oversee the delivery of assistance, bureaucratic requirements cannot unjustifiably delay or impede access. The Group also received allegations that both the Houthis and the Government of Yemen imposed conditions that food distribution projects include beneficiaries considered loyal to the relevant party.

55. The Group of Experts investigated allegations that the Houthis hampered aid distribution in Al-Jawf. On 1 March 2020, at around 11a.m., armed elements allegedly linked to Houthi forces raided several aid organizations headquartered in Al Hazm Directorate, Al-Jawf, forcing those organizations to cease operations, and used the buildings as military barracks, placing snipers on the headquarters premises. Two organizations had their headquarters completely looted. The Group also received allegations of arrest and/or detention of aid workers by the Houthis, and was able to verify the detention in 2018 of a person who was still detained at the time of writing.

4. Other practices affecting access to food and health

56. Some policies of parties to the conflict, in particular the Government of Yemen and the Houthis, may violate the right to adequate food. In the area of Aden, for example, while some interruptions to water supplies were due to damage from hostilities, the Group of Experts received allegations of water being diverted to the highest bidder in the areas of Al Qallo'ah, Al Safi, and Al Zaytoon near the highlands in Aden, despite complaints to the water authorities.

57. The closure of Sana'a International Airport since August 2016 by the Government of Yemen and the coalition has precluded civilians from accessing life-saving health care and humanitarian supplies. The airport was reportedly reopened for limited humanitarian purposes from 3 February 2020, however, these exceptions have been insufficient to address the overwhelming humanitarian need. The airport's full reopening continues to be linked to peace negotiations.

58. The coalition's restrictions on imports and access to Al-Hudaydah port have contributed to shortages of fuel and other necessities and to inflation, thereby exacerbating the economic and humanitarian crisis.

59. The Group of Experts found reasonable grounds to believe that the Houthis have interfered with humanitarian aid in violation of IHRL and IHL. The Group notes that all parties to the conflict have impeded humanitarian operations and the population's access to food and healthcare. The Group considers that the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen could be substantially mitigated if parties to the conflict began to respect and comply with their obligations under international law.

D. Enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of ill-treatment

60. The Group of Experts continued to investigate cases of enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture, including sexual violence, and other forms of ill-treatment, committed by parties to the conflict. In many cases, these violations are being committed against persons who are perceived as opposed to a particular party to the conflict, including human rights defenders and journalists.

61. The Group investigated, for instance, 21 cases of enforced disappearance by the Houthi forces in Sana'a. At the time of writing, three women remained disappeared in and around Sana'a, one of them since mid-2018. The Group also investigated eight cases of enforced disappearance by the Ta'izz Axis of the Yemeni Armed Forces and actors affiliated to the Islah Party. Since the beginning of the conflict, individuals have been disappeared for periods ranging from several months to four years. Unofficial detention facilities in Ta'izz, including those located in public buildings, for instance the Nahda school, are believed to have been used to detain disappeared persons. The Group verified cases of enforced disappearances and noted the anguish experienced by the families of those disappeared, not knowing the fate of their relatives, in addition to the social, economic and gendered impact on families and communities.

62. The Group of Experts found that parties to the conflict have continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain people in violation of Yemeni and/or international law. Persons arrested on criminal charges are frequently denied their right to be brought before a court within 24 hours as required under the Yemeni constitution. Many cases investigated by the Group involved persons being detained by militias affiliated with authorities in control of territory, and held without charge for prolonged periods, including in unofficial and secret detention sites. In many cases, political considerations have been key motivating factors – with persons being detained on the basis of perceived affiliation with an opposing party and some being held for the purpose of prisoner exchange deals (even where persons are subject to an order for release). The Group was informed that in some cases of detention by the Houthis payments were demanded from the families of detainees for their release.

63. Those in detention are frequently subjected to torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Group of Experts investigated cases in Sana'a of women and men, including journalists and human rights defenders, arbitrarily detained by the Houthis in prisons, such as Sana'a Central Prison, unofficial facilities like the Security and Intelligence detention centre, and in secret detention facilities, including former residential buildings in and around Sana'a, as described in para. 70. Many of these individuals were tortured, including being subjected to prolonged solitary confinement, sexual violence, suspension for prolonged periods of time, electrocution, burning, beating and mock executions.

64. Similar cases of torture, including sexual violence, and other forms of ill-treatment, were verified at Al Saleh Prison in Ta'izz, particularly in the National Security section operated by the Houthis. The Group verified that 14 men and one boy were subjected to torture, including sexual violence in eight cases, to extract written confessions or punish them while levelling accusations of affiliations to different political and military groups. Methods included repeated and severe beating with sticks, electric cables, iron bars; electrocution; removal of fingernails; the electrocution and beating of the genitals with threats of sterilisation; forced nudity; and solitary confinement. Those tortured included human rights activists, educators, and legal professionals. Three former detainees described to the Group how they were transferred from Al Saleh Prison to Dhamar Community College detention facility and Dhamar North 'Al Ghabra' Prison, and subjected to torture during interrogations at these two facilities, including sexual violence by electrocution of the genitals in two of these cases.

65. In relation to the Government of Yemen, the Group of Experts verified the cases of five men and two boys who, while being detained by Government of Yemen forces in Ma'rib Political Security Prison, were subjected to torture, including suspension in painful positions, crawling on broken glass and screws, beating and electrocution of genitals with threats of sterilization, and burning of genitals.

66. The Group of Experts continued to investigate arbitrary detention and torture, including sexual violence against men and boys, perpetrated by United Arab Emirates forces prior to their withdrawal from Yemen in mid-2019, at the secret detention facility in Al Buraiqeh coalition Base, Aden. The Group verified two further cases from that period in which members of the forces raped one man and subjected one boy to another form of sexual violence.

67. The Group of Experts found reasonable grounds to believe that parties to the conflict are continuing to engage in enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and torture, including sexual violence, in violation of IHRL and, depending on the level of nexus with the conflict, IHL. Such acts may also amount to war crimes, including cruel treatment and torture, committing outrages upon personal dignity, and rape and other forms of sexual violence.

E. Gender-based violence

68. Entrenchment of patriarchal gender norms and marginalization of women and girls, as well as persons with a non-conforming sexual orientation and/or gender identity, has continued by parties to the conflict. Women, girls, men and boys remain at serious risk of all forms of gender-based violence, including sexual violence. While this section focuses on violations committed by the Security Belt forces backed by the United Arab Emirates, and the Houthis, it should be read in conjunction with findings on sexual violence committed in detention facilities by the Government of Yemen and Emirati forces, and the Houthis, presented elsewhere in this report.

69. Following its earlier investigations of mass arrests by United Arab Emirates-backed Security Belt forces of migrants on 'national security' grounds at makeshift facilities in Lahj and Aden during March-July 2019, the Group investigated the occurrence of sexual violence in this context. It verified that Security Belt forces raped five women, four girls and subjected 12 boys and three men to forced nudity and two women and two girls to other forms of sexual violence. One survivor recounted being raped on multiple occasions over 13 days by a total

of 28 soldiers. Rapes included gang rape by multiple male soldiers. The Group has serious concerns about further allegations that these forces raped another 30 women and girls and 3 boys.

70. The Group of Experts continued to investigate cases of women detained by the Houthis – in secret detention facilities operating in at least five former residential buildings in and around Sana'a between December 2017 and December 2019 – because of their political views and/or participation in demonstrations. They accused detainees of prostitution and immorality, supporting the coalition, spying and affiliation with enemies. The Group verified that Houthi individuals raped six women, with several being raped on multiple occasions over extended periods, and subjected two of these women to other forms of sexual violence. The six women described how the male interrogators and female Zainabiyat[8] guards referred to the rapes as 'purification' and 'rehabilitation' for detainees' sins and supporting the war efforts. Detainees heard the screams and muffled cries of others allegedly being raped in neighbouring rooms. The rapes occurred in conjunction with other humiliating and degrading treatment, and torture.

71. Discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity have been exacerbated in certain governorates since the conflict started. The Group of Experts verified cases of violations committed by Houthi and Security Belt forces against persons on the grounds of their sexual orientation and gender identity between 2016 and July 2020. Nine witnesses described how they survived violations, including arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, torture and sexual violence. Interrogators accused them of spreading prostitution and homosexuality and supporting the enemy in doing so.

72. The Group found reasonable grounds to believe that parties to the conflict continue to commit acts of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, in contravention of IHRL and IHL. Such acts may amount to war crimes, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, cruel treatment and torture, and committing outrages upon personal dignity.

F. Child recruitment and use in hostilities and related violations

73. A generation of Yemen's children has been immeasurably damaged through child recruitment, abuse, and deprivation of their most basic human rights, including education. The Group continued its investigations into the complex patterns of child recruitment and use in hostilities by multiple parties to the conflict. The Group's verified figures only provide a partial account of the scale and nature of child recruitment in Yemen, which risks the lives of boys in all governorates, and girls in Houthi-controlled territory, and puts them at risk of other violations. Whether and how a Yemeni boy or girl was recruited depended on which party to the conflict controlled a child's home territory and on his/her age, gender and economic status. Across all verified cases, poverty and hunger were powerful push factors, rendering children vulnerable to monetary incentives and manipulation by recruiters and peers. The Group documented 259 cases, and verified 16 individual cases, of children recruited and used in hostilities by several parties to the conflict.

74. Between June 2015 and February 2020, in all governorates under their control, the Houthis recruited boys as young as 7 years old. The Group verified 11 individual cases and received allegations about the recruitment of a further 163 boys. They were recruited from schools, poor urban areas and detention centers through indoctrination, financial incentives, abduction and/or peer recruitment with very high rates of boys being used in combat resulting in their death or injury.

75. The Group also received credible reports regarding Houthi recruitment of 34 girls (ages 13-17), between June 2015 and June 2020, for use as spies, recruiters of other children, guards, medics, and members of the Zainabiyat. Girls from Houthi-affiliated or socioeconomically disadvantaged families, or those in detention, were especially targeted for

[8] The Zainabiyat are Houthi-organized women's security groups, trained to support the Houthis through, inter alia, indoctrination of women and girls in Houthi ideology, maintaining order in detention facilities and conducting law enforcement activities.

recruitment. Twelve of these girls allegedly survived sexual violence and/or forced and early marriage directly linked to their recruitment.

76. The Group received 24 allegations and verified three cases of boys recruited and used by some brigades/units, with the alleged involvement of members of the coalition and/or the Government of Yemen, all following a similar modus operandi. Boys were recruited in Ta'izz and Lahj in Yemen, then transported to Saudi Arabia where they were trained and then deployed in Yemen. Nearly all of these boys were used as combatants, eight allegedly died in combat and others were detained by the Houthis for their alleged association with the enemy.

77. The Group verified the cases of two boys recruited by the Government of Yemen Special Security Forces in Shabwah, used in combat in Abyan in May-June 2020, and detained by the STC in Aden.

78. The Group of Experts notes with great concern that some parties to the conflict continue to deprive children of their fundamental right to education through the military use of schools, manipulation of education and targeting of educators. During this reporting period, the Group verified the case of a school being used as a military barracks and detention facility in Shabwah by the Government of Yemen Special Security Forces. The Group also received allegations of military use of four schools by the Houthis for weapons storage and manufacturing, and training. Moreover, the Group found that the Houthis used the education system to indoctrinate students on Houthi ideology, incite violence and recruit children in 34 schools across six governorates (Amran, Dhamar, Raymah, Sa'ada, Sana'a, Ta'izz). The Group verified two cases of detention and forced displacement of educators, and received allegations of 54 educators being threatened, detained and financially/administratively sanctioned for refusing to collaborate with Houthi child recruitment efforts.

79. These violations have devastated children's already precarious access to education during the conflict. The Group of Experts found reasonable grounds to believe that the Houthis, the Government of Yemen and the coalition have continued to violate children's right to education and to recruit and use children in hostilities in contravention of IHRL and IHL. Enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities is a war crime.

G. Treatment of specific groups

80. The Group remains extremely concerned at the situation of minorities, including religious minorities and social minorities such as the *Muhamasheen*, and IDPs, migrants and refugees, all of whom face ongoing discrimination and whose risk of exploitation and physical abuse is exacerbated by the dire economic situation and the conflict itself. The Group is also concerned that the parties to the conflict continued to target human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and activists to repress dissent and curtail criticism. Women human rights defenders also continue to face repression by all parties based on their gender and/or their work on women's rights. The Group received reports of the numerous obstacles endured by persons with disabilities in accessing health services and assistive devices, humanitarian aid, education and employment opportunities. Older people are also particularly vulnerable.

81. Religious minorities continue to face particular barriers to the enjoyment of their rights. For protection reasons, the Group is not able to publicly report on all of the violations experienced by these groups.

82. The Group of Experts has previously reported on the situation of the Baha'is detained in Sana'a on the basis of their religious faith, in particular highlighting their arbitrary arrest, torture and denial of due process in court proceedings. On 22 March 2020, the Appellate Specialized Criminal Court upheld the conviction of Hamed bin Haydara, and his death sentence. On 25 March 2020, the President of the Houthi Supreme Political Council announced a pardon for Hamed bin Haydara, and requested that the concerned authorities release all Baha'i prisoners. On 30 July 2020, the Baha'i detainees were released and expelled

from Yemen. In addition, the Group received credible reports of lawyers being targeted and threatened, even detained, for their defense of the Baha'i detainees.

83. Despite the ongoing armed conflict and the catastrophic humanitarian crisis, IOM reported that in 2019 over 138,000 African migrants crossed the Gulf of Aden and reached Yemen as a transit destination. The Group of Experts received accounts of migrants, including children, being held captive by smugglers in informal camps in Lahj Governorate, where they were subjected to physical abuse, including sexual violence, and released only upon payment of a "ransom". The Group also received allegations that unidentified armed men in uniform in the South were collaborating with smuggling networks. Many migrants reported experiencing racial discrimination, arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment upon reaching Aden and on the road to Ataq, as well as sexual violence, as described above in para. 69.

84. The continuation of the conflict, with its attendant breakdown of public order, has aggravated the already precarious situation of minorities, IDPs, migrants and refugees in Yemen. The Group of Experts concludes that all of these groups continue to be discriminated against in their enjoyment of rights, and face a heightened level of violations and abuse.

H. Violations related to the administration of justice

85. The administration of justice is crucial for the safeguarding and protection of human rights. The Group of Experts focused its investigation on three main issues within the administration of justice: the operation of the Specialized Criminal Courts (SCC), violations of fair trial rights, and attacks on the judiciary.

86. The Group finds that the SCC, particularly in Sana'a, is being used as an instrument to suppress dissent, intimidate political opponents and/or develop political capital to be used in negotiations. Rights of the accused are regularly denied. Significant control is exercised by the security and political leadership. With the advent of the dual system of state institutions, including the creation of two separate Supreme Judicial Councils, the appointment of judges has become further influenced by political and sectarian considerations.

87. In many areas of the country, the justice system is virtually paralyzed. The SCC in Sana'a (in the de facto authorities controlled area) is perhaps the most active judicial body in Yemen. In this court, rates of conviction and the associated imposition of the death penalty have significantly increased, although the death penalty has not been implemented in these cases.

88. On 4 March 2020, for instance, 35 MPs were sentenced to death in absentia by the SCC in Sana'a ostensibly for "having taken actions threatening the stability of the republic of Yemen, its unity, and security of its territory". The charges were brought against MPs who supported the internationally recognized government. Further, the convictions have been used to provide a veneer of legitimacy to the seizure of assets and properties of the defendants. The MPs with whom the Group spoke confirmed that they did not receive any formal communication regarding the legal proceedings against them and learned of the decision from social media. They did not formally instruct a legal representative to appear on their behalf as they do not recognize the legitimacy of the SCC in Sana'a.

89. Ten journalists, arbitrarily detained since 2015, were convicted on 11 April 2020 of national security offences arising out of their broadcasts and writing. Four journalists were sentenced to death. They are currently appealing the decision. Six journalists were sentenced to time already served, with three years of assigned residence and the appointment of a guarantor. They should have thus been immediately released. As of 30 June 2020, only one of the six had been released, while the others are reportedly to be released as part of a prisoner exchange. This case exemplifies the way in which journalists have been subjected to a pattern of violations in order to silence their work.

90. The SCC has been less active in areas under the control of the Government of Yemen and STC. There are however, similar concerns about it being used as a security court to serve the political interests of the authorities in charge. On 2 April 2020, the SCC in Aden opened a trial in absentia of 32 Houthi leaders.

91. Violations of the right to a fair trial continue to occur across Yemen. This includes the use of torture to compel confessions. Many accused are denied access to a lawyer, and to confidential and safe communications with their legal representatives. During trial proceedings, the evidence adduced by the prosecution tends to be limited to written statements. There is no opportunity for the accused to cross-examine witnesses, or to present rebuttal evidence. Additionally, due to political interference, and corruption, the right to be tried before an impartial and independent court in Yemen cannot be guaranteed.

92. Individual judicial officials face violent attacks, arrests, threats, and intimidation motivated by political/security reasons and personal interests. For example, in Ta'izz in early 2020, one judge survived an attempted assassination, and, in a separate incident, a courtroom was raided by militia affiliated with the Government of Yemen, resulting in suspension of proceedings. Some judges and prosecutors have reported self-censorship in carrying out their functions in order to avoid antagonising the party in control of an area.

93. Maintenance of the rule of law is a pillar of any free society. The breakdown in law and order, including the targeting of judges, prosecutors and lawyers by parties to the conflict, has indelibly impacted the independent, impartial and effective administration of justice in ways that have fomented public fear and insecurity. The Group of Experts concludes that serious violations of IHRL are occurring within the administration of justice in Yemen, in particular through the politicisation of the system, the regular denial of fair trial rights, attacks on judicial officers and the imposition of the death penalty in a manner contrary to international law.

VI. Accountability

94. No right exists without a remedy. So it is with the widespread and systematic commission of human rights violations in Yemen, which demand remedial action. Over the last three years, the Group of Experts has been reporting on serious violations of IHRL and IHL, some of which may amount to international crimes. It has made repeated calls for relevant authorities to conduct prompt investigations into alleged violations and to prosecute those responsible, in line with their international obligations. The Group is not aware of any trials that have been completed relating to violations it has documented. The Group has also stressed the need to realise victims' rights to an effective remedy (including reparations). Regrettably, the Group of Experts has seen no timely and effective remedies for victims in Yemen.

95. The Government of Yemen's National Commission of Inquiry (NCOI) reported, in its 8th Report, having monitored and documented a further 2,940 individual incidents. The Group welcomes the progress made by the NCOI, while noting that its operations remain somewhat hampered by non-recognition by the de facto authorities, limited cooperation from the coalition, security/access issues for its field officers, and more recent COVID-related restrictions. The NCOI has referred over 1000 cases to the Attorney-General. To date, only 19 trials have commenced and remain pending.

96. In relation to the coalition, the Group of Experts notes that overall the JIAT has conducted over 190 investigations examining specific airstrikes. However, the Group of Experts continues to have concerns as to the thoroughness and credibility of its analysis and findings. There remains a tendency for JIAT to accept the legality of airstrikes involving military targets, without taking into proper account principles of proportionality or precaution. It is understood that JIAT has referred eight cases (involving specific airstrikes) to national military prosecutors for action. No public information is available on the current status of these cases.

97. There is little information in relation to de facto authorities' investigations and/or prosecutions, and the Group of Experts continues to question their commitment to accountability.

98. Although the Yemeni justice system bears the largest potential caseload in relation to violations committed in Yemen, the Group of Experts is concerned that it presently lacks the means and capacity to conduct prosecutions in a manner consistent with IHRL. Even prior to

the current conflict, the system's operation was compromised by the legacy of executive control experienced during the Saleh regime. It faced issues with respect to, inter alia, corruption, inadequate protection of fair trial rights, discrimination against women, and attacks and serious threats to judicial actors. The conflict has only exacerbated the situation. Additionally, victims, witnesses, and judicial actors lack sufficient protection against reprisals in politically sensitive cases. On a technical level, Yemeni law requires reform to be able to address the full range of violations amounting to international crimes and applicable modes of liability. While less information is available in relation to the military justice system, the Group of Experts considers it would in all likelihood be even less human rights compliant than its civilian counterpart.

99. The international community can and should take further initiatives to help bridge the acute accountability gap that persists in relation to the conflict in Yemen. In particular, the Group of Experts calls upon the Security Council to refer the situation in Yemen to the International Criminal Court, and to expand the list of persons subject to Security Council sanctions. It supports the establishment of a criminally-focused investigation body, similar to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria, to conduct further investigations and prepare case-files to be shared with relevant prosecutorial authorities. States must investigate war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, where appropriate, prosecute such crimes. States must also fulfil the duties to prosecute or extradite that arise under IHRL. The Group of Experts more broadly encourages third States to collaborate so as to be able to exercise their powers to undertake 'universal jurisdiction' prosecutions where appropriate. In the longer term, the Group encourages Yemeni authorities and the international community to engage in further dialogue about the creation of a special tribunal such as a "hybrid tribunal" to prosecute cases of those most responsible.

100. The Group of Experts also calls upon all involved to ensure that respect for human rights is placed at the heart of any future peace negotiations and that no steps are taken that would undermine respect for human rights and accountability, such as granting blanket amnesties.

101. Authorities need to integrate all aspects of victims' right to a remedy (including reparations) in their response to violations. Reparations should be provided for all serious violations, and be non-discriminatory, gender sensitive, and accessible to and informed by consultations with victims.

102. The Group of Experts repeats its concern about third States transferring arms to parties to the conflict in Yemen in blatant disregard of the documented patterns of serious violations of IHL and human rights law in the conflict to date. The Group believes that they are failing in their responsibilities to ensure respect for IHL, and that some States may be violating their obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty. Furthermore, such support may amount to "aiding and assisting" internationally wrongful acts in contravention of international law.

VII. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

103. **The Group of Experts has reasonable grounds to believe that the Governments of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Southern Transitional Council, to the extent they exercise jurisdiction, and as applicable to each party, are responsible for human rights violations including arbitrary deprivation of life, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, gender-based violence, including sexual violence, torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the recruitment and use in hostilities of children, the denial of fair trial rights, violations of fundamental freedoms, and economic, social and cultural rights.**

104. **The Group of Experts has reasonable grounds to believe that the de facto authorities are responsible for human rights violations in the areas over which they exercise effective control, including arbitrary deprivation of life, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, gender-based violence, including sexual violence,**

torture, and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the recruitment and use in hostilities of children, the denial of fair trial rights, and violations of fundamental freedoms, and economic, social and cultural rights.

105. **The Group of Experts has reasonable grounds to believe that the parties to the armed conflict in Yemen have committed a substantial number of violations of international humanitarian law. Subject to a determination by an independent and competent court, the Groups finds that:**

(a) **Individuals in the coalition, in particular Saudi Arabia, may have conducted airstrikes in violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, acts that may amount to war crimes;**

(b) **Individuals in the Government of Yemen and the coalition (in particular Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and the Southern Transitional Council have committed, as applicable to each party, acts that may amount to war crimes, including murder of civilians, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, outrages upon personal dignity, denial of fair trial, and enlisting children under the age of 15 or using them to participate actively in hostilities;**

(c) **Individuals in the coalition have conducted indiscriminate attacks using indirect-fire weapons, acts that may amount to war crimes;**

(d) **Individuals in the de facto authorities have conducted indiscriminate attacks using indirect-fire weapons and used anti-personnel landmines, acts that may amount to war crimes;**

(e) **Individuals in the de facto authorities have committed acts that may amount to war crimes, including murder of civilians, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, outrages upon personal dignity, denial of fair trial, impeding humanitarian relief supplies, and enlisting children under the age of 15 or using them to participate actively in hostilities.**

106. **Where possible, the Group of Experts has identified individuals who may be responsible for such international crimes, and has confidentially transmitted those names to the High Commissioner for Human Rights. More information is needed on some incidents documented by the Group to establish responsibilities.**

B. Recommendations

107. **To ensure justice for all victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and in the light of the ongoing armed conflict, the Group of Experts recommends that parties to the conflict:**

(a) **Agree to a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and achieve a sustainable and inclusive peace, through a peace process which includes the full involvement of women, youth and minority groups;**

(b) **Immediately cease all acts of violence committed against civilians in violation of applicable IHRL and IHL, and take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure;**

(c) **Immediately put an end to any measures that exacerbate the humanitarian crisis; in particular, cease attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the population; take the steps necessary to remove disproportionate restrictions on the safe and expeditious entry into Yemen of humanitarian supplies and other goods indispensable to the civilian population; facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief; and take appropriate steps to ensure realisation of the right to an adequate standard of living, in particular for women and children;**

(d) **Ensure the immediate release of all persons who have been arbitrarily detained and, where possible, detainees at risk of contracting COVID-19; and ensure that all persons who are detained are housed in official detention facilities; that the legality of their detention is promptly reviewed by a competent judicial authority, and**

that the rights of detainees are respected, including the right not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment and the right to a fair trial;

(e) **Establish a procedure whereby individuals can report disappearances, ensuring that reports are investigated independently, efforts are undertaken to find the victim, and perpetrators are held to account;**

(f) **Immediately end all forms of sexual and gender-based violence against women, children and men, including in detention;**

(g) **Respect and protect the rights to freedom of expression and belief, and other fundamental rights and freedoms;**

(h) **Cease and prevent the recruitment and use of children in the armed conflict; further ensure the demobilization and effective disarmament of boys and girls recruited or used in hostilities, and the release of those captured; implement effective programmes for their rehabilitation, physical and psychological recovery, and reintegration into society;**

(i) **Engage in de-mining efforts across Yemen;**

(j) **Strengthen local organisations' and international NGOs' capacity for monitoring human rights and humanitarian law violations, including GBV and violations of children's rights;**

(k) **Cooperate fully with the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts;**

(l) **Cooperate fully with the National Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of violations and abuses committed by all parties to the conflict in Yemen;**

(m) **Support reform of the justice system to ensure impartial and independent administration of justice, including addressing issues associated with the recruitment and tenure of judges, corruption and gender-bias within the justice system;**

(n) **Conduct prompt, transparent, independent, impartial, thorough, credible, effective and gender-sensitive investigations of all violations and crimes committed during the conflict, and ensure accountability and respect for victims' right to an effective remedy.**

108. **The Group of Experts recommends that other States and regional and international organizations:**

(a) **Promote and support all efforts, notably by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, to reach a cessation of hostilities and achieve a sustainable and inclusive peace, through a peace process which includes the full involvement of women, youth and minority groups;**

(b) **Take specific initiatives to support accountability for serious violations and crimes, as outlined in para 99;**

(c) **Take all reasonable measures to ensure respect for IHL and IHRL by all parties to the conflict; in particular, by refraining from providing arms and military support to the parties;**

(d) **Provide appropriate funding of humanitarian aid to support fulfilment of human rights in Yemen.**

109. **In particular, the Group of Experts recommends that:**

(a) **The Human Rights Council ensure that the situation of human rights in Yemen remains on its agenda by: renewing the mandate of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts; and ensuring that the resources provided to the Group allow for the effective delivery of its mandate including collecting, preserving and analysing information related to violations and crimes;**

(b) **The Security Council integrate the human rights dimensions of the conflict in Yemen more fully into its agenda; and ensure there is no impunity for the most serious**

crimes by, *inter alia*, referring the situation in Yemen to the International Criminal Court, and expanding the list of persons subject to Security Council sanctions.

Annex I: Mapping of the Main Actors[1]

1. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a Coalition with Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar[2], Morocco[3], Senegal, the Sudan and the United Arab Emirates to initiate military action at the request of President Hadi. The United States and the United Kingdom, among other States, advise and support the Coalition. On 25 March 2015, Saudi Arabia announced "Operation Decisive Storm" and launched an air campaign against areas controlled by the Houthis. After 28 days it announced the end of Decisive Storm operations and the achievement of its goals. It then announced the start of "Operation Restoring Hope", in which the Coalition's land, sea and air operations have continued to the present time.

Established in Riyadh, the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition has a military structure like other organizational military structures. According to the Coalition, establishing the Joint Forces command took into consideration international rules, and all land, naval and air operations are under its command.

In the second half of 2019, the Coalition underwent major changes as the United Arab Emirates and Sudan withdrew most of their land forces from their areas of responsibility, which placed an increased burden on Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government. This withdrawal led to major setbacks for the Coalition on the fronts of Sa'ada, Al-Jawf and Ma'rib, in which the Yemeni forces are under the operational control of the Coalition leadership, represented in Saudi Arabia. The main actors are as follows:

Serial	***Name***	***Position***	***Remarks***
1	Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman الامير محمد بن سلمان	Minister of Defence	23 January 2015
2	General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili[4] فريق اول ركن فياض بن حامد الرويلي	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	27 February 2018
3	Prince Lieutenant General Fahad bin Turki bin Abdalazeez الامير فريق ركن فهد بن تركي بن عبدالعزيز	Joint Forces Commander	Coalition Commander 27 February 2018 – 31 August 2020[5]
4	Lieutenant General Fahd bin Abdallah al-Mtair[6] فريق ركن فهد بن عبدالله المطير	Land Forces Commander	27 February 2018
5	Prince Lieutenant General Turki bin Bandar bin Abdalazeez al-Saud[7] الامير فريق ركن تركي بن بندر بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود	Air Force Commander	27 February 2018

[1] This annex represents the main actors in Yemen during the reporting period, and is separate and distinct from the strictly confidential list of alleged perpetrators that is provided to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

[2] In 2017, Qatar withdrew from the Coalition.

[3] In February 2019, Morocco withdrew from the Coalition.

[4] Replaced General Abdulrahman bin Saleh al-Bunyan who had this post since 2014. See: https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1729621

[5] On 31 August 2020, Service of Lieutenant General Fahad is terminated by referring him to retirement and referring him to investigation and replaced by Lieutenant General Mutlaq bin Salim bin Mutlaq Al-Azima, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, as Acting Commander of the Joint Forces. See: https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2127629

[6] Replaced Prince Lieutenant General Fahad bin Turki bin Abdalazeez. See: http://www.janes.com/article/78278/top-saudi-commanders-replaced

[7] Replaced Major General Mohammed Saleh al-Outaibi. See: https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1729618

6	Admiral Fahd bin Abdulla al-Ghufaili [8] فريق ركن فهد بن عبدالله الغفيلي	Naval Commander	4 November 2017
7	Lieutenant General Mazyad Sulaiman al-Amro[9] فريق ركن مزيد بن سليمان العمرو	Air Defence Commander	27 February 2018
8	Lieutenant General Jarallah bin Mohammed bin Jarallah al-Elwait فريق ركن جار الله بن محمد العلويط	Strategic Missile Force Commander	27 February 2018
9	Major General Pilot Abdullah al-Ghamdi لواء ركن طيار عبدالله الغامدي	Air Operations Director	Coalition Deputy Commander
10	Major General Majed Hamdi al-Harbi[10] لواء ركن ماجد بن حمدي الحربي	Task Force 7070 Commander	Saudi Southern Border, Najran
11	Brigadier General Abdullah bin Haseed al-Inezi عميد ركن عبدالله بن حصيد العنزي	Task Force 1501 Commander [11]	Coalition HQs in the 6th Yemeni Military District
12	Brigadier General Abdulrhman bin Suliman al-Haji عميد ركن عبدالرحمن بن سليمان الحجي	Task Force 808 Commander[12]	Socotra
13	Brigadier General Pilot Mujahed al-Outaibi عميد ركن طيار مجاهد العتيبي	Task Force 802 Commander[13]	Aden
14	Brigadier General Mukhtar el-Mtairi عميد ركن مختار المطيري	Task Force 800 Commander[14]	Saudi Southern Border, Samtah, Jazan
15	Major General Abdul Hameed al-Muzaini لواء ركن عبد الحميد المزيني	Task Force Commander[15]	Ma'rib, on 8 July 2020, new leader appointed[16]
16	Major General Mohammad bin Ali al-Amri لواء ركن محمد بن علي العمري	South Military Regional Commander[17]	Saudi Southern Border
17	Brigadier General Hassan Abdullah al-Shihri عميد ركن حسن عبدالله الشهري	Sharurah Operations Center Commander[18]	Saudi Southern Border

[8] Replaced Admiral Abdullah bin Sultan bin Mohammad al-Sultan. See: https://www.mod.gov.sa/Leaders/CONF/Pages/CV.aspx

[9] Replaced Lieutenant General Mohammed bin Awadh bin Mansour Suhaim. See: https://www.mod.gov.sa/Leaders/COADF/Pages/CV.aspx

[10] See: http://www.saudpost.com/44415/ Also, see: https://alwatanalan.com/?p=48620

[11] See: https://freedom-ye.com/tweet/5234

[12] See: http://www.alriyadh.com/1815418

[13] See: https://almasdaronline.com/articles/179006. Also, see: https://www.spa.gov.sa/2005057

[14] See: http://www.saudpost.com/44415/

[15] See: https://yemnews.net/index.php/reports/2020-03-17-18-28-20. Also, see: https://twitter.com/malarab1/status/1285251597543645186

[16] Major General Yusef al-Shahrani was appointed to replace Major General Abdul Hameed al-Muzaini. See: http://www.ypagency.net/278376

[17] https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=2020433

[18] http://www.masa-press.net/2018/11/11/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%81/

18	Major General Saad al-Jaber لواء ركن سعد الجابر	The Saudi official in charge of the Mobilization Committee	Saudi Southern Border
19	Brigadier General Ahmed Rashid al Shihri عميد ركن أحمد راشد الشهري	4th Armoured 'King Khaled Force' Brigade	Saudi Southern Border
20	Brigadier General Fahd bin Daham al-Markhan[19] عميد ركن فهد بن دهام المرخان	11th Brigade Commander	Saudi Southern Border

2. United Arab Emirates

In the second half of 2019, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) started a two-phase withdrawal of ground troops from Yemen. The first phase, implemented in June and July, involved withdrawal of forces mainly from the western coastal front. The second phase, which occurred in October, left a minimal presence of troops in Al Mukha, Aden, Balhaf, and Al-Mukalla. The withdrawal of the UAE troops from Aden was completed with the handover of its base in Al Buraiqeh to KSA forces.[20] Following these withdrawals, the UAE announced that "they fought three enemies in Yemen at the same time: the Houthi rebels, the Muslim Brotherhood and the terrorist groups of Islamic State and Al-Qaeda". The UAE further announced that "it will continue its air operations in Yemen".[21]

The Deputy Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces announced a shift from what he called a 'direct proximity' strategy - implemented by the UAE Armed Forces for five years from the launch of the Decisive Storm Operation - to an 'indirect proximity' strategy as implemented by Yemeni forces formed, trained and equipped by the UAE, saying "[t]hese forces must liberate Yemeni lands".[22] The forces equipped and trained by the UAE include the Security Belt forces and the Shabwah and Hadramaut elite forces, which are currently affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council. In addition, there are the UAE equipped and trained Giants brigades, Tuhama brigade and Tariq forces on the west coast, Al-Hudaydah and west of Ta'izz.

Participation of the UAE Armed forces in Yemen within the Saudi-led Coalition has included Land forces, the Presidential Guard Command under Major General Michael Simon Hindmarsh,[23] Special Forces, Air Forces & Air Defense, and the Naval Forces.

UAE Land Forces, Presidential Guard Command, and Special Forces have participated in 15 taskforces with more than 15,000 soldiers in various cities and governorates of Yemen, engaging in more than 130,000 air sorties and more than 500,000 flying hours. The Naval Forces participated in 3 naval taskforces involving more than 50 naval warships, more than 3,000 personnel and more than 1000 naval missions.[24] The main actors are as follows:

Serial	*Name*	*Position*	*Remarks*
1	Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan الشيخ محمد بن زايد آل نهيان	Deputy Supreme Commander	
2	Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum[25] الشيخ محمد بن راشد آل مكتوم	Minister of Defence	

[19] See at : https://ajel.sa/zNRrWb/

[20] UN documents, S/2020/326, Para. 24. Available at: https://undocs.org/ar/S/2020/326. Also, see: https://yemenshabab.net/news/51137

[21] Lieutenant General Eisa Saif al-Mazrouei, Joint Operations Commander in Yemen and Deputy Chief of Staff of UAE Armed Forces brief, 9 February 2020. Available at: https://www.wam.ae/en/details/1395302822487

[22] "The UAE today celebrated the participation of its brave sons in the Arab Coalition Forces in Yemen". ABU DHABI, 9th February, 2020 (WAM). Available at: https://wam.ae/en/details/1395302822487

[23] Following his retirement from the Australian Army, Hindmarsh accepted the positions of Special Advisor – National Security to the United Arab Emirates, and major general in charge of the United Arab Emirates Presidential Guard. See: https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2013/october/15/131015-sea-khanjar

[24] "The UAE today celebrated the participation of its brave sons in the Arab Coalition Forces in Yemen". ABU DHABI, 9th February, 2020 (WAM). Available at: https://wam.ae/en/details/1395302822487

[25] See: https://uaecabinet.ae/en/details/news/ chief-of-staff-of-armed-forces-promoted-to-the-rank-of-minister

3	Lieutenant General Hamad Mohammed Thani al-Romaithi[26] فريق ركن حمد محمد ثاني الرميثي	Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces	3 January 2005
4	Major General Eisa Saif al-Mazrouei لواء ركن مهندس عيسى سيف المزروعي	Deputy Chief of Staff	Joint Operations Commander
5	Major General Saleh Mohammad Saleh al-Ameri لواء ركن صالح محمد صالح العامري	Commander of Ground Forces	
6	Major General Ibrahim Nasser Mohammed al-Alawi لواء ركن طيار ابراهيم ناصر محمد العلوي	Commander of Air Force and Air Defence	
7	Major General Sheikh Saeed Bin Hamdan Bin Mohammad al-Nahyan[27] لواء ركن الشيخ سعيد بن حمدان بن محمد آل نهيان	Commander of Navy	11 October 2017
8	Brigadier General Ali Ahmed el-Tanjee عميد ركن علي احمد الطنيجي	Coalition Commander	Aden, May 2015 - January 2016 Al-Hudaydah[28], 2018 – 2019
9	Brigadier General Ali el-Nuaimee عميد ركن علي سيف النعيمي	Coalition Commander	Aden, January 2016 - July 2016
10	Brigadier General Sultan el-Habsee عميد ركن سلطان الحبسي	Coalition Commander	Aden, July 2016 - January 2017
11	Brigadier General Naser el-Otaibee عميد ركن ناصر مشبب العتيبي	Coalition Commander	Aden, January 2017 – July 2017
12	Brigadier General Ahmed el-Blushee عميد ركن احمد البلوشي	Coalition Commander	Aden, July 2017 – January 2018
13	Brigadier General Muhammad el-Hasani عميد ركن محمد الحساني	Coalition Commander	Aden, January 2018 – July 2018
14	Brigadier General Awad Saeed al-Ahbabi[29] عميد ركن عوض سعيد الاحبابي	Coalition Commander	Aden, July 2018 – January 2019

[26] Ibid

[27] His rank Major General (Rear Admiral)

[28] The leader of the Arab Alliance on the West Coast of Yemen talks about a qualitative operation for the "liberation of Al-Hudaydah", Middle East, https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2018/09/18/saudi-led-coalition-launches-offensive-strategic-yemeni-port-city, September 2018. Also see: https://twitter.com/amalka4_al. Also, Brigadier General Ali Al-Tanaiji. Commander of major battles against Houthi coup in Yemen, Al-Ain, 18 September 2018. See: https://al-ain.com/article/al-hodeidah-yemen-arab-alliance-al-taniji

[29] Hadi meets with coalition commander in Aden, stresses need for coordination, al-mawqea post, 18 July 2018. Available on: https://almawqeapost.net/news/32379. Also, see: Al-Islah leader detained by pro-Uae forces released in Aden, Alquds, 18 July 2018, available on: https://www.alquds.co.uk/%EF%BB%BF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC

15	Brigadier General Rashed Saeed al-ghafli aka Abu Mohammed[30] عميد ركن راشد سعيد الغفلي المكنى ابو محمد	Coalition Commander	Aden January 2019 – July 2019
16	Brigadier General Abd el-Salam al-Shahi[31] عميد ركن عبد السلام الشحي	Coalition Commander	Western Coast, 2015 – 2019
17	Abu Khalifa Said el-Mahri ابو خليفة سعيد المهري	Coalition Intelligence Officer	Aden, Abyan, Lahj, 2015 – 2019

3. Government of Yemen (International Recognized Government)

a. The Government of Yemen Armed Forces

In 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic merged with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) to form the Republic of Yemen. The two military services unified in one Yemeni Armed Forces, although regional and ideological divisions influenced both. The agreement at unification was for 50 per cent of the army to be from the South and 50 per cent from the North. However, what happened in practice violated the agreement. During the 1994 civil war, the former northern and southern armies faced each other on the battlefield, where the southern armed forces lost the war. Following defeat, remnants of the southern army were disbanded. Many top southern generals fled the country, and most of its officers were forcibly retired.[32]

The military was organised around five military regions or zones that covered territories of the Republic of Yemen: north west, central (including Sanaa), middle, southern and eastern. However, two formations, the First Armoured Division and the Republican Guard, retained semi-autonomous status. In 2000, then President Saleh's eldest son, Ahmed Ali, took command of the Republican Guard, expanding it by building eight new brigades. By the time of the 2011 uprising, they comprised eighteen of the nation's best equipped, trained, funded and managed brigades.[33]

On 23 November 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative was signed, which included an article decreeing that a committee should be formed to restructure the army. Vice-president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who became President in 2012, issued a decree forming this committee on 4 December 2011. On 19 December 2012, President Hadi issued presidential decree 104 (2012), to regulate the structure of the armed forces. The first article of the decree described the Yemeni Armed Forces organizational structure in detail.[34] The decree went to the heart of the political challenge by disbanding both the Republican Guard led by Ahmed Ali and the First Armoured Division lead by Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.

On 10 April 2013, President Hadi issued Decree 16 (2013), in which the military operations theatre of the Republic of Yemen was divided into seven regions. According to this structure, the current command and control of the Government of Yemen Armed Forces is as follows (see also Appendix 1):

1. **Chain of command (Leadership)**:
   a. The President of the Republic of Yemen, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and chairman of National Defence Council, President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi.

[30] In the presence of the leader of the Arab coalition. Emergency forces launch second phase of training year, al-ayyam, 16 July 2019. Available on: https://www.alayyam.info/news/7V89EB9O-3B9G6V-A58A. Also see https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2019/07/15/1259578.html . Arab Coalition Commander Visits Facility Protection Brigade Camp, see: https://www.cratersky.net/posts/19296

[31] West Coast Coalition Commander Announces Complete Liberation of Al Hodaydah Airport, Sky news, 20 June 2018, see: https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1065290-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%94%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84

[32] See: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-new-conflict.pdf

[33] Ibid

[34] For more details, see A/HRC/42/CRP.1, annex I, appendix 1

b. Minister of Defence.
c. Chief of the General Staff.

2. Ministry of Defence:
a. Minister of Defence, responsible for the state's defence policy and strategic security for the armed forces.
b. Five specialized assistants for the Minister of Defence.

3. **The General Staff**. Responsible for preparing, securing and managing the affairs of the forces. Consists of the Chief of the General Staff, his Deputy and five committees (operations, intelligence, training, human resources, and logistical support) each with specialized departments.

4. **Main branches of the Yemeni Armed Forces**. According to the decree, there are five military branches under the Ministry of Defence, as follows:
a. Air Force and Air Defence.
b. Navy and Coastal Defence.
c. Land Forces.
d. Border Guard.
e. Strategic Reserve.

Serial	*Name*	*Positon*	*Location*	*Remarks*
1	President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi الرئيس عبد ربه منصور هادي	Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces	Riyadh, KSA	February 2012
2	Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar لواء ركن علي محسن الاحمر	Vice President[35]	Riyadh, KSA	3 April 2016
3	Major General Mohammad Ali al-Maqdashi لواء ركن محمد علي المقدشي	Minister of Defence[36]	Ma'rib	8 November 2018
4	Major General Zghair Hammoud Aziz[37] لواء ركن صغير حمود عزيز	Chief of the General Staff[38]	Ma'rib	28 February 2020
5	Major General Tahir Ali al-Aqaili لواء ركن طاهر علي العقيلي	Adviser to the Supreme Commander[39]	Ma'rib	8 November 2018
6	Major General Adel al-Qumari لواء ركن عادل هاشم القميري	General Inspector	Ma'rib	
7	Major General Ahmad Mohsen Salem al-Yafa'ay لواء ركن أحمد محسن سالم اليافعي	Chief of Intelligence Staff[40]	Ma'rib	22 January 2019
8	Major General Saleh Mohammad Timis لواء ركن صالح محمد طميس	1st Military District Commander[41]	Sayun, Hadramaut	22 November 2016

[35] Presidential Decree 48 (2016). https://www.facebook.com/alimohsensalehalahmar/posts/1011971235550346/

[36] Presidential Decree 71 (2018). https://buyemen.net/news67338.html. Also available at https://almasdaronline.com/article/republic-decrees-appointing-minister-of-defence-chief-of-staff-and-governor-of-aden. Also, see UN document S/2019/83

[37] Replace Major General Abdullah Salem Ali Al-Nakhai

[38] Presidential Decree 10 (2020). Available at https://almasdaronline.com/articles/178267

[39] Presidential Decree 182 (2018). Available at https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/121600

[40] Presidential Decree 12 (2019). Available at: https://naba-ye.com/news1105.html

[41] Presidential Decree 154 (2016). https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/61690

9	Major General Faraj Salamin al-Bahasani لواء ركن فرج سالمين البحسيني	2nd Military District Commander[42]	Al-Mukalla, Hadramaut	Since 2015
10	Major General Mohammad al-Hubashi لواء ركن محمد أحمد الحبيشي	3rd Military District Commander[43]	Ma'rib	14 August 2019
11	Major General Fadhl Hasan لواء ركن فاضل حسن	4th Military District Commander[44]	Aden	21 November 2016
12	Major General Yahya Hussien Salah لواء ركن يحي حسن صالح	5th Military District Commander[45]	Midi, Hajjah	17 February 2018
13	Major General Hashem Abdullah Al Ahmar لواء هاشم عبد الله الاحمر	6th Military District Commander	Al-Jawf	Resigned on 11 February 2020
14	Major General Ahamad Hassan Gubran لواء أحمد حسن جبران	7th Military District Commander[46]	Nihm	27 January 2020
15	Brigadier General Sanad Al-Rahwa عميد ركن سند الرهوه	Commander of 1st Presidential Protection Brigade[47]	Shaqra, Abyan	It has been located in Shaqra since August 2019[48]
16	Brigadier General Abdulhakeem Dawkam[49] عميد ركن عبد الحكيم دوكم	Commander of 2nd Presidential Protection Brigade[50]	Al Abr, Hadramaut	Responsible for protecting Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar
17	Brigadier General Louay Awad Mohamed Zamiki[51] عميد لؤي عوض الزامكي	Commander of 3rd Presidential Protection Brigade	Lawdar and Shaqra, Abyan	It was previously stationed in Khur Maksar district of Aden, in the Jabal Hadid camp
18	Brigadier General Mahran Qubati عميد مهران القباطي	Commander of 4th Presidential Protection Brigade[52]	Shaqra, Abyan	It has been located in Dar Sad, Aden. Then in the "Reception" military

[42] On 29 June 2017, President Hadi named Major General Faraj al-Bahasani, Governor of Hadramaut, to replace Major General Ahmed bin Breik, Presidential Decree 34 (2017) available at: https://buyemen.net/news48340.html. Also see : https://arabic.sputniknews.com/arab_world/201508161015325772

[43] Presidential Decree 106 (2019). Available at: http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=96231

[44] Yemen's Southern Powder keg, Chatham House, Peter Salisbury, 2018. Presidential Decree 155 (2016)

[45] Presidential Decree 20 (2018). Available at: https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/104230. Also, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tbu9zpVUNPM

[46] Presidential Decree 10 (2020). See: http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=114859

[47] The 1st Brigade was specifically named in the Military Arrangements annex of the Riyadh Agreement

[48] Before that it was based in the Presidential Palace in Aden's Crater district

[49] The Presidential Protection Brigades: Hadi's muscle in the south, 11 May 2020. Available at: https://al-masdaronline.net/national/771

[50] This brigade's forces have been protecting the vice president since 2017, while some units in the brigade are fighting on the front lines between Ma'rib and Sana'a

[51] Presidential Decree 51 (2019). Available at: https://www.facebook.com/1784290338507592/photos/a.1795004187436207/2304017236534897/?type=3. Also, see: https://adenkbr.news/60171/.

[52] See: Who rules the grip on the interim capital? Available at: https://almasdaronline.com/articles/168745

				camp in Marib governorate[53]
19	Brigadier General Abdullah al-Subaihi عميد ركن عبد الله الصبيحي	Commander of 39th Armoured Brigade[54]	Shaqra, Abyan. Since 3 September 2019[55]	Before 10 August 2019 was stationed in Bader Camp, Khur Maksar, Aden
20	Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Jaber[56] عميد محمد علي جابر	Commander of 89th Infantry Brigade	Shaqra, Abyan. Since 3 September 2019[57]	Before 10 August 2019 was stationed in Bader Camp, Khur Maksar, Aden
21	Major General Abu Baker Hussien Salim لواء ابو بكر حسن سالم	Commander of Abyan Axis[58]	Abyan Axis, Zingibar	11 March 2017
22	Brigadier General Mohammad Ahmed Mulhem عميد ركن محمد أحمد ملحم	Commander of 111th Infantry Brigade [59]	Ahwar, Abyan	6 July 2015
23	Brigadier General Saif Ali Mohammed al-Qefish عميد ركن سيف علي القفشي	Commander of 115th Infantry Brigade[60]	Shaqra, Abyan	On 15 May 2020, STC captured BG Saif[61]
24	Brigadier General al-Hamzah Ali Salim al-Jadani عميد ركن الحمزه علي الجعدني	Commander of 119th Infantry Brigade[62]	Abyan	Died in June 2020[63]
25	Brigadier General Ali Muhammad al-Qamali عميد ركن علي القملي	Commander of 103rd Infantry Brigade	Hajeen, Abyan	Died in June 2020[64]
26	Brigadier General Azeez Naser al-'Atiqi[65] عميد ركن عزيز ناصر العتيقي	Atiq Axis commander and 30th Infantry Brigade commander[66]	Atiq, Shabwah	January 2017

[53] The brigade suffered heavy losses in January when the Houthis fired a ballistic missile at the Reception camp, killing more than 110 people. See: https://al-masdaronline.net/national/266

[54] Military commanders appointed to merge southern resistance with army. See https://aawsat.com/home/article/539666

[55] https://almasdaronline.com/articles/171279

[56] Presidential Decree 67 (2019). Available at: http://alwattan.net/news/79294

[57] https://almasdaronline.com/articles/171279

[58] On 11 March 2017 appointed as a governor, Presidential Decree 20 (2017). Available at: https://almawqeapost.net/news/17543, also on http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=22963

[59] See: https://www.sahafah24.net/y/show207243.html

[60] Presidential Decree 45 (2018). Available at: https://almandeb.news/?p=98572. Also see: https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1247463

[61] See: https://yemen-press.com/news116823.html

[62] Brigadier General Hamza al-Jadani assigned acting commander of 119th Infantry Brigade. See: http://www.marsad.news/news/31106 also see: https://www.al-omanaa.com/news72621.html

[63] https://www.alminasapress.com/news266698

[64] See: https://shabwaah-press.info/news/65859

[65] UN Documents, S/2020/326, Annex 10. Available at: https://undocs.org/ar/S/2020/326

[66] Presidential Decree 6 (2017).Available on http://mosnad.net/news.php?id=18513, also available at: http://yemen-now.com/news1444016.html

27	Brigadier General Jahdal Hanash al-Awlaki[67] عميد جحدل حنش العولقي	Commander of 21st Brigade[68]	Bayhan –Atiq, Shabwah	Since 2015
28	Brigadier General Mahdi Yuslim al-Qomishi عميد مهدي يسلم القميشي	Commander of 2nd Mountain Infantry Brigade[69]	Atiq, Shabwah	January 2019
29	Major General Khaled Qassem Fadhal لواء ركن خالد قاسم فاضل	Ta'izz Axes Commander and 145th Infantry Brigade[70]	Ta'izz	November 2019
30	Brigadier General Abdul Rahman Thabet Shamsan عميد ركن عبدالرحمن ثابت شمسان	Commander of 17th Infantry Brigade[71]	Ta'izz	Appointed as a Commander of 35th Armoured Brigade
31	Brigadier General Sadeq Sarhan عميد ركن صادق سرحان	Commander of 22nd Armoured Brigade	Ta'izz	Since 2015
32	Brigadier General Abdul Rahman Thabet Shamsan[72] عميد ركن عبدالرحمن ثابت شمسان	Commander of 35th Armoured Brigade	Ta'izz	July 2020
33	Abu Bakr al-Jabuli أبو بكر الجبولي	Commander of 4th Mountain Infantry Brigade[73]	Ta'izz	Not a military officer
34	Brigadier General Abdulaziz Ahmed Nasser al-Majidi[74] عميد عبد العزيز أحمد ناصر المجيدي	Commander of 170th Air defence Brigade	Ta'izz	20 February 2018
35	Adnan Rozaiq عدنان رزيق	Commander of 5th Presidential Protection Brigade	Ta'izz	Head of Ta'izz Axis Operation Branch
36	Brigadier General Amjad Khalid عميد ركن امجد خالد	Commander of the Transportation Brigade[75]	Al Mukha, Al-Hudaydah	The brigade was stationed in Aden till December 2019
37	Brigadier General Khaled Yaslam عميد ركن خالد يسلم	Commander of 107th Infantry/Safe Brigade[76]	Safer, Ma'rib	August 2013
38	Major General Mohammad al-Hubashi[77]	Commander of 13th Infantry Brigade	Ma'rib	Also, commanding 3rd MD

[67] UN Documents, S/2020/326. Annex 10. Available at: https://undocs.org/ar/S/2020/326

[68] UN Documents S/2019/83, Annex 8. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/S/2019/83

[69] Ibid

[70] See: https://www.deeproot.consulting/single-post/2018/08/16/Caught-in-the-Middle-A-Conflict-Mapping-of-Ta'izz-Governorate

[71] Press interview with Brigadier General Abdel Rhman al-Shamsani, 3 April 2019, available at: http://aljanadpost.net/p-3939

[72] Presidential Decree 33 (2020). See: https://www.almashhadalaraby.com/amp/199770

[73] See: https://almadaniya.net/articles/1150.htm

[74] Presidential Decree 2 (2018). Available at: http://www.alharf28.com/p-2592

[75] Transport Brigade Commander Amjad al-Qahtani promoted to Brigadier General. Available at: http://yemen-now.com/news1510335.html

[76] S/2020/326. Annex 8. Available at: https://undocs.org/ar/S/2020/326

[77] Presidential Decree 106 (2019). Available at: https://presidenthadi-gov-ye.info/ar/archives/%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%b1%d8%a6%d9%8a%d8%b3-

لواء ركن محمد الحبشي

39	Brigadier General Ali Ammar al-Jaifi عميد علي عمار الجائفي	Commander of 14th Armoured Brigade[78]	Sahn al Jin, Ma'rib	September 2019
40	Brigadier General Mujahid al-Shaddadi عميد ركن مجاهد الشدادي	180th Air Defence Brigade	Sahn al Jin, Ma'rib	
41	Brigadier General Mohammed al-Asoudi[79] عميد محمد العسودي	Commander of 203rd Infantry Brigade	Sirwah, Ma'rib	January 2020
42	Maj. Gen. Mufreh Muhammad Bahih[80] لواء مفرح محمد علي بحيبح	Commander of 26th Infantry Brigade and Bayhan Axis	Harib, Ma'rib	March 2018
43	Colonel Yahya Tamah عقيد يحي تامه	Commander of 29th Infantry Brigade	Ma'rib	
44	Brigadier General Hamid Muhammad al-Theifani عميد محمد أحمد الذيفاني	Commander of 310th Armoured Brigade	Al Mass, Ma'rib	Killed on 4 April 2020[81]
45	Brigadier General Ahmed Al-Barihi عميد ركن أحمد البريهي	Commander of 139th infantry brigade	Nihm	
46	Brigadier General Mohamed Ahmed al-Halisi al-Muradi عميد محمد أحمد الحليسي المرادي	Commander of 312nd Armoured Brigade	Sirwah, Ma'rib	Kofel camp

Brigades deployed to the 5th Military District Area of Responsibility in Hajjah Governorate at the Saudi Southern Borders, which are supported by SLC[82]:

Serial	***Name***	***Position***	***Location***	***Remarks***
1	Brigadier General Abdo Suleiman عميد عبده سليمان	Commander of 25th Mika Brigade	Hajjah	Also, Chief of Staff of the 5th Military District[83]
2	Brigadier General Taha al-Amiri عميد طه العامري	Commander of 105th Infantry Brigade	Hajjah	5th MD
3	Brigadier General Abdullah al-Malaji عميد عبدالله الملاحي	Commander of 2nd Brigade, Border Guard	Hajjah	5th MD[84]

%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%85%d9%87%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%aa%d8%b9%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d9%83/

[78] See: https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/143979

[79] Replaced Zaid al-Shoumi, who was killed in January 2020

[80] Presidential Decree 37(2018). Available at: http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=43845

[81] See: https://almawqeapost.net/news/49368

[82] All brigades have deployed to Hajjah fronts, and belong to the 5th MD except Al Fursan brigade. These brigades are under the operational control of the Task Force 800, Saudi-led Coalition.

[83] See: https://alarshnews.net/?p=6292

[84] See: https://yemen-press.net/news99470.html

4	Brigadier General Muhammad Salman[85] عميد محمد سلمان	Commander of 82nd Infantry Brigade	Hajjah	5th MD
5	Brigadier General Fayez al-Tahesh[86] عميد فايز الطاهش	Commander of 3rd Brigade, Border Guard	Hajjah	5th MD
6	Brigadier General Muhammad Wuhan[87] عميد محمد وهان	Commander of 7th Brigade, Border Guard	Hajjah	5th MD
7	Brigadier General Mohammed al-Salami[88] عميد محمد السلمي	Commander of 10th Brigade, Commandos	Hajjah	5th MD
8	Brigadier General Mohammed al-Hajjouri[89] عميد محمد الحجوري	Special Forces Brigade Commander	Haradh Hajjah	Deployed in the 5th MD AoR
9	Brigadier General Abdo Tarmoum[90] عميد عبده طرموم	Commander of Special Security Brigade	Hajjah	Deployed in the 5th MD AoR
10	Zaid al-Hajouri زيد الحجوري	Al Fursan Brigade Commander[91]	Hajjah	Salafist

Brigades deployed to the 6th Military District Area of Responsibility in Al-Jawf and Sa'ada Governorates at the Saudi Southern Borders[92]:

Serial	*Name*	*Position*	*Location*	*Remarks*
1	Brigadier Hadi Shalfat عميد هادي شلفط	Commander of Al-Dhafer Brigade, Border Guards[93]	Khabb wa ash Sha'af	Al-Jawf fronts
2	Brigadier General Muhammad bin Rasiya عميد محمد بن راسية	Commander of 101st Brigade	Al-Jawf	Al-Jawf fronts
3	Brigadier Heikal Hanaf عميد هيكل حنتف	Commander of 1st Brigade, Border Guards	North Axis	Al-Jawf fronts
4	Brigadier Abdullah al-Dawi عميد عبدالله الضاوي	Commander of 127th Infantry Brigade	Al-Jawf	Al-Jawf fronts
5	Brigadier Hussein al-Usaimi عميد حسين العصيمي	Commander of 161st Infantry Brigade	Al-Jawf	Captured and killed by Houthis in May 2020[94]
6	Colonel Dhafer Haqqan al-Juaidi عقيد ظافر حقان الجعيدي	Al Hasm Brigade Border Guard	Al-Jawf	Al-Jawf fronts
7	Major General Amin al-Okimi لواء أمين العكيمي	Al-Jawf axis battalions	Al-Jawf	Governor
8	Brigadier Manea Abu Saeed عميد مناع ابو السعيد	Al Amal Brigade	Al Hazm	Al-Jawf fronts

[85] See: https://m.yemenalghad.net/news19349.html
[86] Ibid
[87] Ibid
[88] Replace Brigadier General Bilal Shedawah
[89] See: https://m.yemenalghad.net/news19349.html
[90] Ibid
[91] Al Fursan brigade is an independent brigade backed by Saudi Arabia
[92] These brigades are under the operational control of Task Force 1501, SLC. Some of these brigades are led by Salafists leaders backed by Saudi Arabia. Some of the brigades do not exceed 100 persons
[93] See: https://yemennownews.com/article/241171
[94] See: https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/167040

9	Colonel Hamad Rashid al-Azmi عقيد حمد راشد الحزمي	Al Izz Brigade	Al-Jawf	Al-Jawf fronts
10	Brigadier Taher Zemam عميد طاهر زمام	Commander of 9th Infantry Brigade	Kitaf wa Al Boqe'e	Sa'ada fronts
11	Brigadier Abdo al-Mikhlafi عميد عبده المخلافي	Commander of 122nd Infantry Brigade	Kitaf wa Al Boqe'e	Merged with Al Fateh brigade
12	Radad al-Hashimi رداد الهاشمي	Commander of Al Fateh Brigade[95]	Kitaf wa Al Boqe'e	Salafist
13	Brigadier General Bilal al-Shadiewah عميد ركن بلال شديوه	Commander of Al Tahrir Brigade[96]	Kitaf wa Al Boqe'e	In May 2020 merged with Al Tawhid brigade
14	Abd al-Rahman Alloom عبد الرحمن اللوم	Commander of Al Tawhid Brigade[97]	Kitaf wa Al Boqe'e	Sa'ada fronts
15	Brigadier General Saleh al-Majeedi عميد صالح المجيدي	Commander of 6th Brigade , Border Guard[98]	Razih	Sa'ada fronts
16	Brigadier Khaled Kharsan عميد خالد خرصان	Commander of 7th Brigade, Border Guards	Razih	Sa'ada fronts
17	Amin Yahya Hassan al-Suwaidi أمين يحي حسن السودي	Commander of the 2nd Special Forces Brigade	Razih	Sa'ada fronts
18	Brigadier General Adeeb al-Shuhab عميد اديب شهاب	Commander of the 9th brigade, Border Guard	Baqim	Sa'ada fronts
19	Brigadier General Yaser al-Harthi عميد ياسر الحارثي	Commander of the 102 Special Forces Brigade	Baqim	Sa'ada fronts
20	Brigadier General Yaser Hussien Mujali عميد ياسر حسين مجلي	Comm**an**der of the 63rd Brigade	Elb- Baqim	Sa'ada fronts
21	Brigadier General Abdul Karim al-Sadie عميد عبد الكريم السدعي	Commander of the Third Brigade, Ourouba[99]	Al Malaheet, Al Dhahir	Sa'ada fronts
22	Brigadier General Mohammed al-Ajani عميد محمد العجاني	Commander of the Third Brigade, Storm[100]	Shada Front, Sa'ada	Sa'ada fronts

[95] Al Fateh brigade is an independent brigade backed by Saudi Arabia

[96] Al Tahrir brigade is an independent brigade backed by Saudi Arabia led by Turki Al-Wadei, Fawaz Al-Zirari, Ali Mohsen Al-Huda, Abdullah Dugaish, Jamal al-Qala'I, and Bilal al-Shadiewah

[97] Al Tawhid brigade is an independent brigade backed by Saudi Arabia

[98] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2Cyo6F-Pew

[99] See: https://lahjpress.com/news/15498

[100] See: https://www.al-tagheer.com/news109622.html

b. Intelligence, Security, Political, and Civil Administration Actors

The Political Security Organisation was formed in 1992 as the primary intelligence entity responsible for both domestic and external intelligence gathering and analysis, until then President Saleh formed the National Security Bureau in 2002, with Colonel Ammar Saleh, Saleh's nephew, as deputy head director.

In 2001, then President Saleh appointed Brigadier General Yahya Saleh as chief of staff for the Central Security Forces, a paramilitary organisation working under the ministry of interior, which focused on domestic threats. Yahya also supervised the formation of the Central Security Services' counter-terrorism force.

In January 2013, President Hadi announced a major overhaul of the interior ministry. Among other things, he streamlined the number of departments reporting directly to the minister; increased provincial governors' authority over ministry forces in their respective areas; rebranded the controversial Central Security Forces as the new Special Security Forces; and established a General Inspectors office to deal with human rights transgressions, corruption and police violations within the ministry.[101] The main actors are as follows:

Serial	*Name*	*Position*	*Location*	*Remarks*
1	Major General Abdo Mohammed al-Huthaifi لواء عبده محمد الحذيفي	Political Security Organization	Aden	
2	Major General Ahmed Abdullah al-Musabi[102] لواء أحمد عبدالله المصعبي	Head of National Security Bureau	Aden	29 August 2016
3	Major General Mohammad Musleh Eidah, لواء ركن محمد مصلح العيضه	National Security Bureau	Aden	Head of the Yemeni governmental team, RCC
4	Moeen Abdul Malik Saeed معين عبد الملك سعيد	Prime Minister	Riyadh	15 October 2018. On 29 July 2020 he was charged with reforming the cabinet[103]
5	Ahmed bin Ahmed al-Mesry احمد بن احمد الميسري	Minister of Interior		Since 2017
6	Mohammed Abdullah al-Hadrami محمد عبدالله الحضرمي	Minister of Foreign Affaires	Riyadh	September 2019
7	Salem Saleh Salem bin Brik سالم صالح سالم بن بريك	Minister of Finance	Riyadh	September 2019
8	Dr. Ahmed Obaid al-Fadhli الدكتور احمد عبيد الفضلي	Central Bank Governor	Aden	September 2019
9	Ahmed Hamed Limlis [104] أحمد حامد لملس	Governor	Aden	29 July 2020
10	Ahmed Abdullah al-Turky	Governor[105]	Lahj	24 December 2017

[101] See: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-new-conflict-arabic.pdf

[102] Presidential Decree 115 (2016). Available at: https://www.yen-news.net/news25103.html

[103] Presidential Decree 35 (2020). Available at: https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=2115408

[104] Presidential Decree 5 (2020). Available at: : https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=2115408

[105] UN Document, S/2018/68. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/S/2018/68

	احمد عبدالله التركي			
11	Abu Baker Hussien Salim ابو بكر حسن سالم	Governor	Abyan	13 March 2017
12	Mohammed Saleh bin Adio محمد صالح بن عديو	Governor[106]	Shabwah	26 November 2018
13	Nabil Abdu Shamsan نبيل عبده شمسان	Governor [107]	Ta'izz	31 December 2018
14	Amin al-Okimi أمين العكيمي	Governor[108]	Al-Jawf	12 August 2016
15	Sultan bin Ali al-Aradah سلطان بن علي العرادة	Governor	Ma'rib	Since 2012
16	Ali Moqbel Saleh علي مقبل صالح	Governor[109]	Al-Dhale'e	24 December 2017
17	Nasser Al-Khidr al-Sawadi ناصر الخضر السوادي	Governor[110]	Al-Bayda	6 June 2018
18	Faraj Salamin al-Bahasani فرج سالمين البحسيني	Governor[111]	Hadramaut	29 June 2017
19	Mohammad Ali Yasser محمد علي ياسر	Governor[112]	Al Maharah	23 February 2020
20	Ramzi Mahrous رمزي محروس	Governor[113]	Socotra	12 April 2018
21	Major General Ahmed Mohamed al-Hamedi[114] لواء أحمد محمد الحامدي	Director of General Security	Aden	Replaced Major General Shallal al-Shaye, 29 July 2020
22	Brigadier General Saleh al-Sayyed[115] عميد صالح السيد	Director of General Security	Lahj	20 November 2016
23	Colonel Ali Naser Abu Zaid Ba'azab Abu Mashal al-Kazmi[116] عقيد علي ناصر ابو مشعل الكزمي	Director of General Security	Abyan	20 June 2019

[106] Presidential Decree 76 (2018). Available at: https://almawqeapost.net/reports/37080
[107] Presidential Decree 79 (2018). See https://almawqeapost.net/news/37080
[108] Presidential Decree 96 (2016). See: https://suhail.net/news_details.php?lng=arabic&sid=5222
[109] See: https://adengd.net/news/294350/
[110] Presidential Decree 40 (2018). See: https://www.spa.gov.sa/1774040?lang=ar&newsid=1774040
[111] Presidential Decree 34 (2017). See https://buyemen.net/news48340.html.
[112] Presidential Decree 1 (2020). see: https://almahrahpost.com/news/15507#.Xv2C1SgzaUk
[113] Presidential Decree 30 (2018). See: https://www.sabanew.net/viewstory/31699
[114] Presidential Decree 6 (2020). Available at: https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=2115408
[115] See: http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=17541
[116] See: https://imoyemen.com/news/7726

24	Brigadier General Awad Massod al-Dahboul [117] عميد عوض مسعود الدحبول	Director of General Security	Shabwah	3 June 2016
25	Brigadier General Mansour Abdul Rab al-Akhali عميد منصور عبد رب الاكحلي	Director of General Security[118]	Ta'izz	1 January 2018
26	Brigadier General Murad Abu Hatim عميد مراد ابو حاتم	Director of General Security	Al-Jawf	
27	Brigadier General Yahya Ali Abdullah Hamid عميد يحي علي عبدالله حميد	Director of General Security[119]	Ma'rib	23 May 2019
28	Brigadier General Ahmed Mohamed el-Haddad عميد محمد الحداد	Director of General Security[120]	Al-Bayda	25 April 2019
29	Major General Saeed Ali Ahmad Naseeb al-Amri عميد سعيد علي احمد نصيب العمري	Director of General Security[121]	Hadramaut	15 May 2020
30	Brigadier General Mufti Suhail Samouda عميد مفتي سهيل صمودة	Director of General Security[122]	Al Maharah	14 July 2018
31	Colonel Fayez Salem Musa Tahs عقيد فايز سالم موسى طاحس	Director of General Security[123]	Socotra	3 October 2019
32	Colonel Abd Rabbo al A'tab al-Sharif عقيد عبد ربه الاكعب الشريف	Commander of Special Security Forces[124]	Shabwah	4 September 2019

4. Armed Groups – Non-State Actors

Armed groups affiliated to the Southern Transitional Council[125]

a. **Security Belt Forces. The Security Belt Forces** is a non-state armed group, created by the UAE in 2016 with the approval of President Hadi, who issued a presidential decree to form the support brigades. It soon became an operational and administrative force controlled by the Emirates that had formed, trained and armed it. The Government of Yemen has stated that the security belt forces has not been under its command and control since its formation.[126] After the withdrawal of Emirati ground forces from Yemen, the Security Belt Forces came under the operational control of the Southern Transitional Council. The number of Security Belt Forces exceed 30,000 fighters. They exercise military and security functions and are located in Aden, Abyan, Lahj, Al-Dhale'e and Socotra. Among the most prominent leaders of the Security Belt Forces are the following individuals:

[117] Ministerial Decree 33 (2016). See : https://shabwaah-press.info/news/35417
[118] Presidential Decree 1 (2018). Available at: https://yemenshabab.net/locales/31572
[119] Presidential Decree 72 (2019). Available at: https://yemenpressapp.info/news106432.html
[120] See: https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/131767
[121] See: https://almawqeapost.net/news/50531
[122] See: https://almawqeapost.net/news/32281
[123] Presidential Decree 34 (2019). See: https://sahafahnet.com/show6492465.html
[124] See: http://shabwah24.net/news/1274
[125] The Southern Transitional Council was established in 2017, headed by Adroos Al-Zubaidi. His deputy is Sheikh Hani bin Brik
[126] UN document, S/2020/326, para 25. See: https://undocs.org/en/S/2020/326

Serial	*Name*	*Position*	*Location*	*Remarks*
1	Brigadier General Mohsen Abdullah al-Wali عميد محسن عبدالله الوائلي	Security Belt Commander	Aden	
2	Lieutenant Colonel Nasr Atef al-Mashushi مقدم ناصر عاطف المشوشي	Commander 1st Support Brigade Emergency Forces[127]	Yafa'a, Lahj	April 2020
3	Brigadier General Nabil al-Mashushi عميد نبيل المشوشي	Commander of 3rd Support Brigade	Ras Abbas camp	
4	Colonel Abd al-Latif al-Sayyad[128] عقيد عبد اللطيف السيد	Commander of Security Belt Forces[129]	Abyan	Mid-2016
5	Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed al-Oban مقدم محمد العوبان	Deputy Commander of Security Belt Forces[130]	Abyan	
6	Brigadier General Wadhah Omar Abdalaziz	Security Belt Commander[131]	Aden	Now in Lahj
7	Jalal Nasser al-Rubaie جلال ناصر الربيعي	Security Belt Commander[132]	Lahj	22 December 2018
8	Colonel Hader al-Shukhaty عقيد حدار الشوحطي	Commander 4th Support Brigade[133]	Lahj, al-Rebat	
9	Colonel Mukhtar al-Nubi عقيد مختار النوبه	Commander 5th Support Brigade[134]	Lahj	
10	Ali Omar Kafaien[135] علي عمر كافين	Security belt commander	Socotra	
11	Osan al-Anshly اوسان العنشلي	Commander of 12 Storm Brigade	Aden	
12	Colonel Ahmed Qaid al-Qubbah عقيد احمد قايد القبه	Security Belt Commander	Al-Dhale'e	

[127] See: https://almandeb.news/?p=245302

[128] The Daily Mail, 24 March 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3009836/In-south-Yemen-militia-leader-presidents-ally.html .

[129] (Nadwa Al-Dawsari, "The Popular Committees of Abyan: A Necessary Evil or an Opportunity for Security Reforms?" Middle East Institute, March 5, 2014, http://www.mei.edu/content/popular-committees-abyanyemen-necessary-evil-or-opportunity-security-reform

[130] UN Document, S/2019/83, Annex 4. Available at: https://undocs.org/ar/S/2019/83

[131] See: https://www.4may.net/news/43846

[132] New appointments in the leadership of the Security Belt in Lahj, 22 December 2018, see: https://almashhadalaraby.com/news/58755 . Also, see: https://cratersky.net/posts/7810

[133] UN document S/2019/83 and UN document S/2018/68 annex 6. Also, see https://adenkbr.news/77088/. and https://almashhadalaraby.com/news/101775 ; https://almashhadalaam.com/posts/6593

[134] The first batch of Lahj security graduates at the 5th Brigade Camp, Minister of Interior website, available on: https://imoyemen.com/news/5813

[135] See: https://almandeb.news/?p=255528

b. Shabwah Elite Forces. Like the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwah Elite Forces are a non-state armed group comprised of around 10,000 fighters established, trained and armed by the UAE, and led by Lt. Col. Muhammad Salem al-Buhair. Its mission has included combatting Al-Qaeda and expelling it from Shabwah. After the battle of Aden in August 2019, the military clashes spread to Shabwah and violent confrontations took place between the Shabwah Elite Forces and Government of Yemen forces, from which the government forces emerged triumphant. As a result, the Southern Transitional Council lost its strongest armed formations in the Shabwah Governorate, namely the Shabwah Elite Forces, consisting of seven infantry brigades, with all their facilities, light and medium weapons, wheeled infantry (combat) and other vehicles.[136]

Serial	*Name*	*Position*	*Location*	*Remarks*
1	Lt. Col. Mohammed Salem al-Buhair al-Qamishi [137] مقدم محمد سالم البوحير القمشي	Shabwah Elite Forces Commander	Belhaf	October 2017
2	Lt. Col. Wajdi Ba'aum al-Khelaifi[138] مقدم وجدي باعوم الخلافي	Commander of 4th Brigade, Shabwah Elite Forces	Nassab and Markha	
3	Major Mahdi Mohammed Barahma رائد مهدي محمد براهمه	Shabwah Rapid Intervention Forces[139]		
4	Muhammed Saleh Farah al-Kirby[140] محمد صالح فرح الكربي	Commander of 6th Brigade, Shabwah Elite Forces	Shabwah	Died on 20 July 2020[141]

c. Hadramaut Elite Forces The Hadramaut Elite Forces is, like the Security Belt and Shabwah Elite Forces, a non-state armed group that was formed, armed and trained by the UAE. This force is led by Major General Faraj al-Bahsni, who is the commander of the Second Military Region and governor of Hadramaut. Al-Bahsni did not support the STC decision to declare self-administration in the south.

Armed Groups in the West Coast Front

On the Red Sea coast, Brigadier General Tareq Saleh, nephew of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, commands 'the Joint Resistance Forces', comprising 40,000 to 50,000 fighters, including a mix of Guards of the Republic, Salafi fighters and the local Tuhami Resistance forces consisting of tribesmen from Al-Hudaydah governorate. Saleh defected from the Houthi/Saleh alliance after the Houthis killed his uncle, Ali Abdullah Saleh, in December 2017. He joined the UAE-led campaign against the Houthis along the Red Sea coast in early 2018 and has never formally accepted President Hadi's authority.[142]

a. The National Resistance (Guardians of the Republic): These forces are non-state armed groups, formed from members of the previous Republican Guard Brigades that belong to all Yemeni governorates. The majority of the members of the National Resistance Forces belong to the so-called "Republican Guard", made up of Special Forces, as well as tribesmen. The national resistance forces are led by Brigadier General Tareq Saleh and were formed, trained and armed by the UAE. They participated in the Al-Hudaydah battle in 2018 under the operational control of the UAE.

b. Giant Brigades. These brigades are a non-state armed group formed from the southern resistance elite, most of whose leaders are Salafi. There are currently about 12 brigades, mostly formed, trained, armed and supported by

[136] Ibid

[137] Press interview with commander of Shabwah Elite Forces, Al-Omana post, 2 November 2017, https://al-omana.com/news65261.html

[138] S/2020/326, Annex 10. Available at: https://undocs.org/ar/S/2020/326

[139] UN document S/2018/68. Available at: https://undocs.org/ar/S/2018/68

[140] Ibid

[141] See: https://www.alayyam.info/news/89YGUE54-DRXX6P-DF70

[142] International Crisis Group, Rethinking Peace in Yemen, 2 July 2020. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/rethinking-peace-yemen-middle-east-report-n-216-2-july-2020-enar

the UAE, under supervision from the Joint Operations Center of the Coalition. These forces participated in the successful battle for Bab al-Mandab and the city of Al Mukha alongside the Emirati armed forces, and they coordinate with the various forces of National Resistance and Tuhama forces.

The United Arab Emirates has held complete operational control during operations on the west coast.

Serial	*Name*	*Position*	*Location*	*Remarks*
1	Ali Salim al-Hasni[143] علي سالم الحسني	Giants Forces Commander	West Coast, Al-Hudaydah[144]	Salafist leader
2	Ra'ed Hassan Abdulrahman Saleh al-Habhi رائد حسن عبدالرحمن صالح	Commander of the 1st Giants Brigade[145]	The coast-Ad Durayhimi	Salafist leader, studied at Dar Al-Hadith Center in Dammaj
3	Hamdi Shukri[146] حمدي شكري	Commander of the 2nd Giants Brigade	Zabid-Al Garrahi	Salafist leader
4	Abd Ruhman al-lahji[147] عبدالرحمن اللحجي	Commander of the 3rd Giants Brigade	Al-Hudaydah	Salafist leader
5	Nizar Salim Muhsen al-Wajeh نزار سالم محسن الوجيه	Commander of the 4th Giants Brigade	At Tuhayat[148]	Salafist leader
6	Rashid Salim al-Amri رشيد سالم العامري	Commander of the 5th Giants Brigade	Al Fazzah[149]	Salafist leader
7	Murad Saif Joubeh مراد سيف جوبح	Commander of the 6th Giants Brigade	Al Wazi'iyah	Salafist leader
8	Ali al-Kanini علي الكنيني	Commander of the 7th Giants Brigade	Hays[150]	Salafist leader
9	Mohammad Ali Muqbel محمد علي مقبل	Commander of the 8th Giants Brigade	Al-Hudaydah	Salafist leader
10	Sulaiman Yahya Munaser al-Zarnouki[151] سليمان يحي منصور الزرنوقي	Commander of Al Zaraniq Brigades	Al-Hudaydah	Salafist leader
11	Bassam al-Mahdhar بسام المحضار	Commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade	Al-Hudaydah	Salafist leader

[143] Some reports indicate that Abd al-Rahman Abu Zar'ah al-Muharrami has been appointed as the general commander of the Al Amaliqa Brigades. See: https://www.alminasapress.com/news302690

[144] See: https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/who-are-uae-backed-forces-fighting-western-front-yemen.

[145] See: https://abaadstudies.org/news-59781.html. Also, see: https://almasdaronline.com/article/source-assignment-of-major-general-haitham-qassem-as-a-commander-of-a-military-council-leading-combat-operations-on-the-west-coast. Also see: https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/who-are-uae-backed-forces-fighting-western-front-yemen

[146] See: https://abaadstudies.org/news-59781.html. Also, see: https://almasdaronline.com/article/source-assignment-of-major-general-haitham-qassem-as-a-commander-of-a-military-council-leading-combat-operations-on-the-west-coast. Also see: https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/who-are-uae-backed-forces-fighting-western-front-yemen

[147] Ibid

[148] UN document, S/2019/206. Available at : https://undocs.org/ar/S/2019/206

[149] https://abaadstudies.org/news-59781.html . Also, see: https://almasdaronline.com/article/source-assignment-of-major-general-haitham-qassem-as-a-commander-of-a-military-council-leading-combat-operations-on-the-west-coast ; https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/who-are-uae-backed-forces-fighting-western-front-yemen

[150] UN document, S/2019/206. Available at : https://undocs.org/ar/S/2019/206

[151] Ibid

12	Basher Maqbul[152] بشير مقبل	Commander of 13th Giant Brigade	Al-Hudaydah	Salafist Leader

c. TuhamaResistance Forces: These forces are a non-state armed group consisting of the Resistance Forces from Tuhama region mainly from Al-Hudaydah Governorate, in the west of Yemen. The Tuhama Resistance Forces were trained and armed by the UAE armed forces, with the aim of preparing for the battle for Al-Hudaydah. The Tuhama Resistance Forces achieved victories on 'Al Khawkhah' and 'Hays' fronts, and launched attacks on Houthi positions in 'At Tuhayat' and 'Al Garrahi'. The Tuhama Resistance Forces, led by *Abd al-Rahman Hajri*, are under the supervision of the Joint Operations Room of the Coalition. The United Arab Emirates held complete operational control during operations on the west coast.

Serial	*Name*	*Position*	*Location*	*Remarks*
1	Ahmad al-Kawkabani[153] احمد الكوكباني	Tuhama Resistance	Mujaylis, Ad Durayhimi, Al-Hudaydah	
2	Major General Haitham Qasim Tahir[154] اللواء هيثم قاسم طاهر	Field Commander	Jabaliyah[155]	Previous minister of defence

5. Armed Non-State Actors / Houthi De-Facto Authorities

After President Hadi restructured the military and security institutions, and dissolved the Republican Guard and Central Security Forces, officers loyal to former President Saleh resisted the new structure, and Saleh-linked units remained the dominant force on the ground from Sana'a to Aden.

Tensions began to grow in June and July 2014 when an armed offensive was launched in Amran Governorate by members of "Popular Committees" (armed groups) affiliated with the Houthis, and former Yemeni armed forces and tribesmen loyal to former President Saleh. This marked the beginning of a period of alliance between former President Saleh, forces loyal to him, and the Houthis and their affiliated Popular Committees (hereinafter referred to as "Houthi-Saleh fighters"), which lasted until December 2017, when former President Saleh was killed by the Houthis. Houthi authorities have maintained a similar architecture to the Yemeni Armed Forces: their armed forces are organized around seven military regions, and new commanders have been appointed since the Supreme Revolutionary Committee was established in 2015. The Houthis appointed supervisors within the military units, who have enjoyed great power.

In 2018, a supplementary 'central military district', including Sanaa and the surrounding tribes, has been created and placed under the command of Abdulkhaliq al-Houthi, Abdulmalik's brother. This new district includes military camps formerly associated with the Republican Guard and the Reserve Forces. See Appendix 2.

Ballistic Missiles and UAVs represent the centre of gravity for the Houthis, as the weapons posing the biggest threat to the Coalition.

a. Political, Military, and Security Main Actors

Serial	Name	Position	Location	Remarks
1	Abdulmalik Badr al-Din al-Houthi عبد الملك بدر الدين الحوثي	Leader of the Houthis'[156]	Sana'a	Political, no military rank

[152] See : https://imoyemen.com/cat/2?

[153] Ibid

[154] UN document, S/2019/206, available at: https://undocs.org/ar/S/2019/206

[155] Ibid

[156] United Nations Security Council, available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2140/materials/summaries/individual/abdulmalik-al-houthi

2	Mahdi al-Mashat مهدي المشاط	President of Supreme Political Council	Sana'a	Promoted to marshal rank[157]
3	Mohammed Ali Abdulkarim al-Houthi محمد علي عبد الكريم الحوثي	Member of the Supreme Political Council[158]	Sana'a	Military, no rank 18 March 2019
4	Major General Yahya Mohammed al-Shami لواء يحي محمد الشامي	Assistant of Supreme Commander[159]	Sana'a	28 November 2016
5	Major General Hussein Naji Hadi Khairan لواء حسين ناجي هادي خيران	Presidential Adviser for Defense and Security	Sana'a	Former Chief of General Staff
6	Yahya Badr al-Din al-Houthiيحي بدر الدين الحوثي	Minister of Education	Sana'a	April 2016
7	Dr Rashid Aboud Shiryan Abu-Lahem[160] الدكتور رشيد عبود أبو لحوم	Minister of Finance	Sana'a	September 2019
8	Hashem Ismail Ali Ahmed[161] هاشم اسماعيل علي احمد	Governor of the Central Bank	Sana'a	18 April 2020
9	Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami لواء زكريا يحي الشامي	Minister of Transportation[162]	Sana'a	28 November 2016
10	Hisham Sharaf هشام شرف	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Sana'a	28 November 2016
11	Hussein Hamud Al Azi حسين حمود العزي	Assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs[163]	Sana'a	Since 2018
12	Major General Abdulkarim Ammer Aldain al-Houthi[164] لواء عبد الكريم امير الدين الحوثي	Minister of Interior	Sana'a	5 May 2019
13	Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Qasim Attawoos (Abu Adel) عبد المحسن عبد الله قاسم الطاووس المكنى ابو عادل	Head of National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response (NAMCHA) [165]	Sana'a	New Organization, 6 July 2019

[157] On 24 April 2019, the house of representatives granted Mahdi Al-Mashat the rank of marshal. Available at: https://www.yemenipress.net/archives/143698

[158] See: https://almasdaronline.com/articles/165447

[159] See: https://ar-ar.facebook.com/ymmalshami/

[160] SPC decree 41 of 2019. See: https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/229061

[161] SPC Decree 6 (2020). Available at: http://althawrah.ye/archives/621176

[162] Yemen government website, available at: http://www.yemen.gov.ye/portal/transport/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1/tabid/705/Default.aspx

[163] SPC Decree 11 (2018). Available at: https://laamedia.net/news.aspx?newsnum=18890

[164] SPC Decree 90 of 2019. Available at: http://en.althawranews.net/2019/05/president-al-mashat-appoints-minister-of-interior/

[165] SPC Decree 133 (2019). Available at: http://althawrah.ye/archives/583978

14	Major General Abdul Hakim Hashim Ali al-Khiyawani لواء عبد الحكيم هاشم علي الخيواني	Head of Security and Intelligence Service[166]	Sana'a	New organization 1 September 2019
15	Major General Abdulqader Qasim Ahmad al-Shami لواء عبد القادر قاسم احمد الشامي	Deputy Head of Security and Intelligence Service	Sana'a	1 September 2019
16	Major General Abdul Wahid Naji Abu Ras لواء عبد الواحد ناجي ابو راس	Under Secretary of the Security and Intelligence Service for External Operations Affairs	Sana'a	1 September 2019
17	Major General Abdullah Aida al-Razmi لواء عبد الله عيضه الرازمي	The Inspector General of the Ministry of Interior	Sana'a	Sa'ada supervisor
18	Colonel Sultan Saleh Zabin aka Abu Saqer عقيد سلطان صالح الزابن المكنى ابوصقر	Criminal Investigation Directorate	Sana'a	
19	Major General Muhammad Nasser Ahmed al-Atefi[167] لواء ركن محمد ناصر احمد العاطفي	Minister of Defence	Sana'a	28 November 2016
20	Brigadier General Mohamed Ahmed Talbi عميد محمد احمد طالبي	Assistant Minister of Defence for Logistic	Sana'a	
21	Major General Ali Muhammad al-Kahlani. لواء علي محمد الكحلاني	Assistant Minister of Defence for Human Resources	Sana'a	Former Chief of Logistic Staff
22	Major General Mohammed Abdulkarim al-Ghumari لواء ركن محمد عبد الكريم الغماري	Chief of General Staff	Sana'a	13 December 2016
23	Major General Ali Hamud al-Mushki لواء ركن علي حمود الموشكي	Deputy Chief of General Staff[168]	Sana'a	Former commander of Al-Bayda Axis
24	Major General Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim aka Abu Ali al-Hakim[169] لواء عبدالله يحي الحاكم المكنى ابو علي الحاكم	Chief of Military Intelligence Staff [170]	Sana'a	22 August 2017

[166] UN Documents, S/2020/326. Annex 7. See: https://undocs.org/ar/S/2020/326

[167] Decree 56 (2016). Available at: https://yemen-nic.info/ministations/detail.php?ID=10028

[168] UN documents, S/2018/68 and S/2019/83

[169] United Nations Security Council, available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2140/materials/summaries/individual/abdullah-yahya-al-hakim

[170] Republican Decree Appointing Abu Ali Al-Hakim, Head of General Intelligence Agency, Yemen Press, 22 August 2017, available at: https://www.yemenpress.org/yemen/republican-decree-appointing-abu-ali-al-hakim-head-of-general-intelligence-agency/

25	Major General Yahya Shaalan al-Ghbaisy لواء ركن يحي شعلان الغبيسي	Chief of Human Resources Staff	Sana'a	
26	Major General Muhammad Muhammad Ghaleb al-Miqdad لواء ركن محمد محمد غالب المقداد	Chief of Military Operations Staff	Sana'a	
27	Major General Salih Mosfir Alshaer[171] لواء صالح مسفر الشاعر	Chief of Logistic Support Staff	Sana'a	
28	Brigadier General Ali Muhammad Abu Haleeqa عميد ركن علي محمد ابو حليقه	Military Intelligence	Sana'a	Deputy of military intelligence chief
29	Brigadier General Zakaria Hassan Mohamed al-Sharafi عميد زكريا حسن محمد الشرفي	Officers Affairs Directors	Sana'a	Reports to the Chief of Human Resources Staff
30	Brigadier General Muhammad Muhammad Salih al-Azima عميد محمد محمد صالح العظيمه	Legal Affairs Director	Sana'a	Reports to the Chief of Human Resources Staff
31	Major General Abdul Malik Yahya Muhammad al-Durrah لواء ركن عبد الملك يحي محمد الدره	Logistic Support Director	Sana'a	Reports to the Chief of Logistic Staff
32	Colonel Ibrahim Mohamed al-Mutawakkil عقيد ابراهيم محمد المتوكل	Military Operations Director	Sana'a	Reports to the Chief of Operations Staff
33	Brigadier General Muhammad Ahmad al-Kahlani عميد ركن محمد أحمد الكحلاني	Supply and Logistic Director	Sana'a	Reports to the Chief of Logistic Staff
34	Colonel Muhammad Abdul-Malik Muhammad Ismail al-Marouni عقيد محمد عبد الملك محمد المروني	Housing Director	Sana'a	Reports to the Chief of Logistic Staff
35	Brigadier General Muhammad Muhammad Qaid al-Haimi عميد محمد محمد قايد الحيمي	Military Police Commander	Sana'a	Reports to the Chief of Human Resources Staff
36	Major General (Pilot) Ahmed Ali al-Hamzi لواء طيار أحمد علي الحمزي	Air Force Commander	Sana'a	Reports to the Chief of the General Staff
37	Brigadier General Yahya Abbad al-Ruwaishan عميد يحي عباد الرويشان	Deputy Air Defence Commander	Sana'a	Reports to the Air Force Commander

[171] UN document, S/2018/68, available at : https://undocs.org/ar/S/2018/68

38	Colonel Muhammad Abdullah Saeed عقيد محمد عبد الله سعيد	Tariq Air Base Commander	Ta'izz Airport	Reports to the Air Force Commander
39	Brigadier General Najib Abdullah Dhamran عميد نجيب عبد الله ذمران	Air Base Commander	Sana'a	Reports to the Air Force Commander
40	Brigadier General (Pilot) Zaid Ali bin Ali al-Akwa عميد طيار زيد علي بن علي الاكوع	2nd Aviation Brigade Commander	Sana'a	Reports to the Air Force Commander
41	Brigadier General Mansour Ahmed al-Saadi عميد منصور أحمد السعادي	Naval Forces Chief of Staff[172]	Sana'a	Reports to the Chief of the General Staff
42	Brigadier General Ali Saleh al-Ansi عميد علي صالح الانسي	Commander of the Coastal Defence Brigade[173]	Al-Hudaydah	Reports to the Naval Forces Chief of Staff
43	Brigadier General Abdul Razzaq Ali Abdullah al-Moayad عميد عبد الرزاق علي عبدالله المؤيد	Head of the Coast Guard Authority	Al-Hudaydah	
44	Brigadier General Nasser Ahmed Subhan al-Muhammadi عميد ناصر أحمد صبحان المحمدي	Border Guard Commander[174]	Sa'ada	Reports to the Chief of the General Staff
45	Brigadier General Yousef Abdullah al-Fishi عميد يوسف عبدالله الفيشي	Border Guard Brigades Commander	Sana'a	Reports to the Border Guard Commander
46	Brigadier General Abdullah Yahya al-Hassani عميد عبد الله يحي الحسني	Presidential Protection Brigades Commander[175]	Sana'a	Reports to the Supreme Commander
47	Major General Hussein Muhammad Mohsen al-Rouhani لواء حسين محمد محسن الروحاني	Special Operations Commander	Sana'a	Reserve Forces
48	Brigadier General Fouad Abdullah Yahya al-Imad عميد فؤاد عبدالله يحي العماد	3rd Presidential Protection Brigade Commander[176]	Sana'a	
49	Major General Mubarak Saleh al-Mishn al-Zaidi لواء مبارك صالح المشن الزايدي	3rd Military Region Commander[177]	Ma'rib	Member of the Supreme Political Council

[172] See: https://www.yemenipress.net/archives/129814
[173] See: https://www.yemenipress.net/archives/129814
[174] SPC Decree 25 (2017). Available at: https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/90120
[175] See: http://althawrah.ye/archives/608851
[176] See: https://yemenisport.com/print/641626
[177] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7LFu11f5-JU

50	Brigadier General Abdulwali al-Houthi[178] عميد ركن عبد الوالي محمد عبد الله الحوثي	3rd Military Region, Chief of Operations Branch	Ma'rib	
51	Major General Abdulatif Homood Almahdi لواء عبد اللطيف حمود يحي المهدي	4th Military Region Commander	Ta'izz	Previously was Major General Abu Ali al-Hakim
52	Major General Hmoud Ahmad Dahmush لواء حمود احمد دهمش	Chief of staff, 4th Military Region[179]	Ta'izz	April 2017
53	Major General Hamza Abu Talib عميد حمزة ابو طالب المكنى ابو حمزه	5th Military Region Commander	Al-Hudaydah	Reports to the Chief of the General Staff
54	Major General Jamil Yahya Mohammed Zarah عميد جميل يحي محمد زرعه	6th Military Region Commander[180]	Sa'ada	Reports to the Chief of the General Staff
55	Brigadier General Ali Abdullah al-Aqel عميد علي عبد الله العاقل	6th MR, Chief of Operations Branch	Sa'ada	
56	Colonel Ali Saeed al-Razami عقيد علي سعيد الرزمي	6th MR, Chief of Staff	Sa'ada	
57	Major General Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi aka Abu-Yunus[181] لواء عبد الخالق بدر الدين الحوثي	Central Military Regional Command (Republican Guard & Special Forces)	Al-Hudaydah	Nihm, Al-Jawf, and Ma'rib fronts commander
58	Brigadier General Ahmad Abdullah al-Sharafi عميد أحمد عبد الله الشرفي	Ta'izz Axis Commander[182]	Ta'izz	Replaced Abdullah Hizam Naji al-Dhaban[183]
59	Major General Yahya Abdullah Muhammad al-Razami لواء يحي عبد الله محمد الرازمي	Hamdan Axis Chief of Staff	Sana'a	
60	Brigadier General Abed Abdullah al-Joud عميد ركن عابد عبد الله الجود	Al Fardhah Axis Commander	Sana'a	
61	Colonel Qasim Muhammad al-Ayani عقيد فاسم محمد العياني	Ibb Axis Commander	Ibb	

[178] See: https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/161287

[179] *Ibid*

[180] SPC Decree 171 (2018). Available at: http://yemen-tv.net/index.php?mod=contents&do=view&cid=51&id=13284

[181] Security Council 2140 Sanctions Committee amends two entries on its List. Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12493.doc.htm

[182] Ibid

[183] UN document, S/2017/81, available at : https://undocs.org/ar/S/2018/81

62	Colonel Ahmed Mohammed Ghaylan al-Qahm عقيد أحمد محمد غيلان القحم	Al Boqe'e Axis Commander	Sa’ada	
63	Major General Amin Ali Abdullah al-Bahr لواء أمين علي عبد الله البحر	Samad 2 Brigade Commander	Ta’izz	Former Governor of Ta’izz
64	Colonel Haitham Mansour Zahran عقيد هيثم منصور زهران	Murad Brigade Commander	Sana’a	
65	Brigadier Mohamed Ahmed al-Nazili عميد محمد احمد النزيلي	Heavy Transportation Brigade Commander[184]	Ibb	
66	Colonel Ahmed Abdullah al-Siyani عقيد احمد عبد الله السياني	Light Transportation Brigade Commander[185]	Sana’a	
67	Brigadier General Hussein Ali al-Maqdashi عميد ركن حسين علي المقدشي	3rd Mountain Infantry Brigade Commander	Ma’rib	
68	Brigadier General Zakaria Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed al-Mutaa عميد زكريا محمد أحمد محمد المطاع	4th Armoured Brigade Commander		
69	Brigadier General Ahmed Jaber Naji al-Matari عميد أحمد جابر ناجي المطري	10th Special Forces Brigade Commander		
70	Brigadier General Muhammad Ali Saeed عميد محمد علي سعيد	17th Infantry Brigade Commander	Ta’izz	
71	Brigadier General Ahmed Saleh Ali al-Qarn عميد أحمد صالح علي القرن	22nd Armoured Brigade Commander	Ta’izz	
72	Brigadier General Talal Muhammad Thabet al-Ajal عميد طلال محمد ثابت العجل	33rd Armoured Brigade Commander	Al-Dhale’e	
73	Brigadier General Mansour Mohsen Ahmed Muajir عميد منصور محسن أحمد معجير	35th Armoured Brigade Commander	Ta’izz	Since 2014
74	Brigadier General Ahmed Ali Ahmed Qassem al-Maori عميد ركن أحمد علي أحمد الماوري	39th Armoured Brigade Commander	Ibb	
75	Brigadier General Abdul Wali Abdo Hassan al-Jabri	115th Infantry Brigade Commander	Al-Dhale’e	

[184] See : https://yemen-press.net/news50374.html

[185] See: https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3084419.htm

	عميد عبد الوالي حسن الجابري			
76	Major General Jihad Ali Antar لواء جهاد علي عنتر	127th Brigade Commander[186]	Al-Dhale'e	
77	Brigadier General Abdullah Jamil al-Hadri عميد عبد الله جميل الحاضري	145th Infantry Brigade Commander	Al-Hudaydah	
78	Brigadier General Radwan Mohamed Salah عميد رضوان محمد صلاح	201st Brigade Commander	Al-Dhale'e	
79	Colonel Khaled Ali Hussein al-Andouli عقيد خالد علي حسين العندولي	310th Armoured Brigade Commander	Amran	
80	Brigadier General Saleh Ali Nasser al-Shami عميد صالح علي ناصر الشامي	312nd Infantry Brigade Commander	Sana'a	
81	Brigadier General Hussein Saleh Sabr عميد ركن حسين صالح صبر	314th Infantry Brigade Commander	Sana'a	
82	Khaled al Jaaq خالد الجق	Director of the Military Intelligence Detention Facility	Al-Hudaydah	
83	Harith al-Azi[187] حارث العزي	Ibb Security Directorate	Ibb	January 2019

b. **De-Facto Governors and Supervisors.** The structure of the Houthi supervisory system parallels the administrative structure of the state at the governorate level. The general supervisor is the apex of this hierarchical organisation, and he is the 'shadow counterpart' of the formal state governor. He is in charge of forming the Popular and Revolutionary Committees and of appointing lower-level supervisors at the district level. Moreover, he is capable of exerting pressure to make the 'formal' governor comply with Houthi directives. The general supervisor also appoints three supervisors in charge of specific domains: educational, social and security supervisors.[188]

Serial	***Name***	***Position***	***Location***	***Remarks***
1	Abdul Basit Ali al-Hadi عبد الباسط علي الهادي	Governor	Sana'a	1 September 2019
2	Muhammad Jaber Awad محمد جابر عوض	Governor	Sa'ada	
3	Dr. Faisal Jamaan دكتور فيصل جمعان	Governor	Amran	

[186] See: https://al-hekmah.net/news30451.html

[187] How al-Qaeda leader Harith al-Azi escaped to the Houthis. What is the reality of appointing him to manage IBB security (details), Taiz online, January 2019, available at: https://taizonline.com/news13232.html

[188] The Houthi supervisory system, acaps, Yemen Analysis Hub, 17 June 2020. Available at: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf

4	Major General Hilal Abdo Ali Hassan al-Sufi[189] لواء هلال عبده علي حسن الصوفي	Governor	Hajjah	10 December 2017
5	Major General Amer Hussain Amer al-Marani لواء عامر حسين عامر المراني	Governor	Al-Jawf	
5	Sheikh Muhammad Hussain al-Maqdashi الشيخ محمد حسين المقدشي	Governor	Dhamar	
6	Sheikh Abdul Wahid Salah الشيخ عبد الواحد صالح	Governor	Ibb	
7	Major General Mohammed Saleh al-Haddi لواء محمد صالح الهدي	Governor	Al-Dhale'e	
8	Major General Faisal Ahmed Naser Haider[190] لواء فيصل أحمد ناصر حيدر	Governor	Al Mahwit	Early 2018
9	Major General Faris Mujahid al-Habari لواء فارس مجاهد الحباري	Governor	Raymah	Early 2018
10	Mohammed Ayash Qahim محمد عياش قحيم	Governor	Al-Hudaydah	Replaced Hassan al-Haij[191]
11	Colonel Salim Muhammad Numan Mughalas عقيد سليم محمد نعمان مغلس	Governor	Ta'izz	
12	Major General Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi aka Abu-Yunus لواء عبد الخالق بدر الدين الحوثي	General Supervisor	Amanat Al Asimah	
13	Yahya Al-Moayadi يحي المويدي	Deputy of Sana'a General Supervisor	Sana'a	
14	Abdullah al-Moroni عبد الله المروني	Supervisor	Manakhah, Sana'a	
15	Fadel Mohsen Al Sharafi Abu Aqeel فاضل محسن الشرفي ابو عقيل	General Supervisor	Dhamar	Replaced Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Qasim Attawoos (Abu Adel)
16	Yahya al-Yousifi يحي اليوسفي	General Supervisor	Ibb	
17	Brigadier General Yahya al Qasimi عميد يحي القاسمي	Social Supervisor	Ibb	

[189] https://www.saba.ye/ar/news481408.htm?utm=sahafah24com_D

[190] Decree 6 (2018). See: https://laamedia.net/news.aspx?newsnum=18890

[191] https://almushahid.net/31743/

18	Colonel Shaker Amin al-Shabibi عقيد شاكر أمين الشبيبي	Security Supervisor	Al Udayn, Ibb	
19	Aziz Abdullah al-Hatfi عزيز عبد الله العاطفي	General Supervisor	Al Mahwit	
20	Abdul Quddus al-Hakim عبد القدوس الحاكم	The Martyrs Supervisor	Al Mahwit	
21	Zaid Yahya Ahmed al-Wazir زيد يحي احمد الوزير	General Supervisor	Raymah	
22	Mansour Ali al-Lakumi, aka Abu Naser al-Jahli[192] منصور علي اللكمي المكنى ابو ناصر الجحلي	General Supervisor	Ta'izz	Since 2014
23	Abu Wael al-Houbara, ابو وائل الهبره	Social supervisor[193]	Ta'izz	
24	Ibrahim Amer, ابراهيم عامر	Educational Supervisor[194]	Ta'izz	
25	Amin Hamidan أمين حمدان	Ta'izz Province's Deputy, Supervisor of Ta'izz Coastal Districts	Ta'izz	
26	Naef Abdullah Abdullah Sagheer Abu Khurfshah عميد نائف عبد الله صغير ابو خرفشة	Supervisor	Hajjah	Military Leader
27	Hadi Mohammed al-Kouhlani Abu Ali هادي محمد الخولاني المكنى ابو علي	Security Supervisor[195]	Al-Hudaydah	Former bodyguard and protection officer of Abdul Malik al-Houthi
28	Ali Hassan al-Marani, aka Abu Muntather[196] علي حسن المراني المكنى ابو المنذر	Supervisor	West Coast	Likely killed in June 2018
29	Abdul Lateef Alsharafee عبد اللطيف الشرفي	Supervisor of Hunesh Detention Facility	Al Hudaydah	
30	Abdul Hakim al-Khawani aka al-Karrar عبد الحكيم الخواني المكنى ابو الكرار	Security Supervisor	Ministry of Interior	
31	Major General Yahya Mohammed al-Shami لواء يحي محمد الشامي	Military Supervisor	Ministry of Defence	

[192] Also, he is the general supervisor of al-Saleh prison. See https://www.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=12112&cat_id=3

[193] See: http://www.taiz-news.com/?p=146289

[194] "Ansar Allah" Chants (2/2): Prophecies of Hussein Fulfilled? Al-Arabi, May 2016, available on: https://www.al-arabi.com/s/2062

[195] The appearance of "The Hodeidah Butcher" next to General Kamret sparks a lot of controversy, 25 December 2018, available at: https://mancheete.com/posts/3946. Also see: Arab coalition's 39th wanted image angers Yemenis, Erem news, available at: https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1620129

[196] Two Houthi leaders killed on west coast, Mandab press, 14 June 2018, available at: https://www.mandabpress.com/news49514.html

32	Major General Yusif Ahssan Ismail al-Madani لواء يوسف احسان اسماعيل المدني	Military Supervisor	Ministry of Defence

Appendix 1

Government of Yemen Command and Control



Appendix 2

De Facto Authorities Command and Control



Annex II

Maps

1. Yemen



2. Aden, Abyan, Lahj, Al-Dhale'e and Shabwah governorates

3. Sa'dah, Hajjah, and Al-Jawf governorates



4. Sana’a Governorate

5. Ma’rib Governorate

6. Al-Jawf Governorate



7. Al-Dhale'e Governorate



8. Ta’izz Governorate