



News Brief Update 26

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Contact: Dr. Ian Davis
Email: idavis@natowatch.org
www.natowatch.org

Russia's war with Ukraine

The Ukrainian military [announced](#) on 29 August that it had launched offensive operations in multiple areas along the front line in the Kherson region in southern Ukraine, perhaps signalling the start of [a broad and long anticipated counteroffensive](#) aimed at retaking territory seized by Russia. The capital of the Kherson region was the first major city to be occupied by Russian forces following the Kremlin's invasion in February. Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy [said](#) in an evening address: "If they want to survive, it is time for the Russian military to flee. The occupiers should know: we will oust them to the border. To our border, the line of which has not changed".

Although Ukrainian forces spent weeks targeting Russian supply lines with artillery and sabotage operations in preparation for the attack, it is unclear whether they possess the necessary advantage in troops and firepower to retake Kherson. A senior RUSI analyst, Jack Watling, [argues](#) that Ukraine is seeking to reconcile three conflicting imperatives in its counteroffensive on the Kherson front:

"Firstly, a political demand to demonstrate to Ukraine's international partners that the donation of equipment leads to progress on the battlefield ahead of a challenging winter in which many states will be seeking to curtail expenditure. Secondly, there is the need to continually disrupt Russian forces occupying Ukraine so that they can neither regain the initiative nor consolidate their control of the country. Thirdly, there is the ultimate aim of driving the Russians from Ukrainian soil through a deliberate offensive."

He goes on to argue that Ukrainian offensive operations are likely to be implemented in three broad phases: "the Kherson offensive, a protracted period of asymmetric skirmishing and deep strikes to disrupt Russia's occupation and demoralise its troops, and a period of major combat operations in 2023". Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis is growing (see below), with Russia seemingly now focused on formalising annexation of the occupied territories and economic punishment measures. These may include targeting Ukraine's energy grid and potentially turning off the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station, which could force as many as 2 million Ukrainians across the border into Poland this winter.

IAEA inspectors arrive at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station

A 14-member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [expert mission](#) finally arrived at the Russian-held Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine on 1 September, following months of diplomatic negotiations and [obstacles](#). The mission will assess any physical damage to the plant, determine the functionality of safety and security systems, evaluate staff conditions and perform urgent safeguards activities. After an initial tour of the plant, the head of the IAEA, Rafael Mariano Grossi and seven other members of his team returned to Vienna. Six of the team's experts remained at the site to continue the work. Grossi [said](#) the "physical integrity" of the plant had been "violated several times". Ukrainian officials [accused](#) Russia of manipulating and distorting information shared with the IAEA,

while the Russian defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, accused Ukraine of “nuclear terrorism”. In a [statement](#) on 3 September the IAEA said that the plant had once again lost connection to the last remaining main external power line, but continued to supply electricity to the grid through a reserve line. However, only one of the station's six reactors remained in operation.

Fighting in and around the plant since the beginning of August has raised concerns about the potential for a nuclear accident (see NATO Watch [update 23](#), [update 24](#) and [update 25](#)). Prior to the arrival of the IAEA inspectors both sides continued to [trade accusations](#) of shelling in an around the plant, despite ongoing concern about the [potential risk](#) of radiation leaks. Ukraine reported shelling of multiple locations on the opposite side of the Dnieper river from the plant, including against residential buildings in the main city of Zaporizhzhia and several towns in the area, while Russia's defence ministry said there was more Ukrainian shelling of the plant. Both sides also issued fresh warnings about the risk of radioactive leaks, with Ukraine's state energy operator [cautioning](#) there are “risks of hydrogen leakage and sputtering of radioactive substances”. Ukrainian authorities [distributed](#) iodine tablets to residents who live near the plant in case of radiation exposure. Russia continued to ignore widespread international calls for the area to be demilitarised.

Stalled diplomacy

Negotiations between Ukraine and Russia took place for several months following the invasion, but they did not stop the war, and talks have been stalled for months. There has been some [speculation](#) that a tentative deal to end the war was close to being agreed in April, but that UK Prime Minister reportedly urged President Zelensky to break off the talks with Russia. Before that, negotiations on Donbas had lasted for more than seven years with French and German participation; but despite signed agreements and a ceasefire, the conflict was never resolved. Each side blames the other for a lack of progress and there appears to be no real prospect for any diplomatic

breakthroughs or ceasefires in the near future. Positions between the two sides remain incompatible: Ukraine insists on full sovereignty over all Ukrainian territory as it existed when Ukraine became independent in 1991, while Russia claims sovereignty over Crimea and recognition of independence of the Donbas separatist republics. Moreover, Russia has recognized the independence of the Donbas republics on the whole administrative territory of the Donbas, even though some of that territory remains in Ukrainian hands and is the focus of current fighting.

France and Germany lead a NATO bloc favouring negotiations, while the US and UK lead a bloc that favour continuing to send more advanced weapons. One of the potential frameworks for a negotiated settlement is a four-point Italian proposal, calling for Ukraine committing to neutrality and not joining NATO, security guarantees for Ukraine, and negotiations between Ukraine and Russia on Crimea and the Donbas (see [NATO Watch Update 16](#)). Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev [said](#) in a French television interview on 26 August that Russia was prepared to hold talks with President Zelenskiy subject to certain conditions, but warned Moscow would not stop its assault until its goals had been achieved. “Renouncing (Ukraine's) participation in the North Atlantic alliance is now vital, but it is already insufficient in order to establish peace”, Medvedev told LCI television in quotes reported by Russian news agencies.

Volodymyr Zelenskiy [addressed](#) the Venice film festival on 1 September describing Russia's war on Ukraine as “a primitive plot in three acts for the world to make three dramatic mistakes: to get used to the war, to put up with the war, to forget about the war”. Zelenskiy told the audience “not to remain silent” and “not to remain neutral” to the war.

For options of what a possible settlement for Ukraine might look like, see Cambridge University's [Ukraine Peace Settlement Project](#).

Military and financial assistance to Ukraine

Ukraine continues to rely heavily on international military and financial support from Western states. Most of the military assistance has come in the form of bilateral arms transfers, training and other support, which is being coordinated by the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which meets on an ad hoc basis and involves Ministers of Defence and senior military officials from Western-aligned states from around the world. The next meeting of the Group is [scheduled](#) for 8 September at the US Ramstein Air Base in Germany. In addition, NATO agreed at its June [Madrid Summit](#) to strengthen a 2016 [Comprehensive Assistance Package](#) for Ukraine. The additional elements to the package include both short-term assistance (ranging from fuel, protective equipment to portable anti-drone systems and secure communications) and longer-term support (to help modernize the Ukrainian armed forces to NATO interoperability standards and strengthen its defence and security institutions).

In the five months since Russia launched its war in Ukraine, the United States has [pledged](#) about \$24 billion in military aid to Ukraine—more than four times Ukraine’s 2021 defence budget. America’s partners in Europe and beyond have [pledged](#) an additional \$12 billion, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Britain’s defence ministry [announced](#) on 27 August that it is giving six underwater drones to Ukraine to help clear its coastline of mines and make grain shipments safer. In addition, dozens of Ukrainian navy personnel will be taught to use the drones over the coming months.

For further details on arms transfers to Ukraine, see, the [Forum on the Arms Trade](#). And for a timeline of every US arms shipment to Ukraine that has been announced since the war began, see [here](#).

External military support to Russia is limited to a handful of states, including Iran. According to US officials, Russia has received its first

shipment of [Iranian-built combat drones](#) to use in its war against Ukraine. Russian cargo planes reportedly carrying at least two types of unmanned aerial vehicles departed Tehran on 19 August in what is thought to be the first instalment of a transfer of hundreds of drones from Tehran to Moscow. But an anonymous security official said that “the Russians are not satisfied” due to some initial malfunctions in the Iranian drones during early tests.

Humanitarian consequences of the war

Exact figures for the number of war fatalities, both military and civilian, are difficult to verify and confirm. [Undercounting and manipulation](#) of the data is common in war. Ukraine [claims](#) to have killed more than 45,000 Russian soldiers in the war to date. Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed forces, [said](#) on 22 August at a public forum that nearly 9,000 Ukrainian military personnel have been killed in the war. This is the first time Ukraine has revealed the scale of its military losses since the war began, previously protected as a tightly guarded secret - although in early June, a senior Ukrainian presidential aide [told](#) BBC News 100-200 Ukrainian soldiers were dying in the Donbas region every day. In April, Russia [said](#) it had killed about 23,000 Ukrainian troops.

According to [data collected](#) by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as at 29 August, 5,663 civilians have died since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, including 365 children. The actual figures are likely to be considerably higher, as the receipt of information from some locations where intense hostilities have been going on has been delayed and many reports are still pending corroboration. According to [Action on Armed Violence](#) (AOAV) the number of casualties from explosive violence in the Ukrainian conflict reached 6,720 people by 2 September. From this number, 2,717 were killed and 4,003 were injured across 933 incidents. Ninety-five per cent (6,398) of civilian casualties have occurred in populated areas.

Activities in occupied parts of Ukraine

A [report](#) published by Human Rights Watch on 1 September 2022 documents the forcible transfer of Ukrainian civilians from Mariupol and the Kharkiv region to Russia and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. Forced transfers were “a serious violation of the laws of war that constitute war crimes and potential crimes against humanity”, it said. In addition, the US State Department and researchers from Yale University announced that they found a minimum of 21 detention facilities in Russian-controlled regions of Ukraine. According to their [report](#), there are indications that there may be mass graves near some of the facilities. In a [statement](#) on 25 August, the US State Department urged the Russian government to stop its process of “forced deportations and to provide outside independent observers access to identified facilities and forced deportation relocation areas within Russia-controlled areas of Ukraine and inside Russia itself.”

Further reading:

On outcomes and consequences of the war

Connor Echols, [Diplomacy Watch: Did Boris Johnson help stop a peace deal in Ukraine?](#) Responsible Statecraft, 2 September 2022

Sammad Grover, [NATO's eastern expansion: Was the Russo-Ukrainian War avoidable?](#) Observer Research Foundation, 2 September 2022

Jack Watling, [The Ukrainian Offensive Must Come in Stages](#), RUSI Commentary, 2 September 2022

François Diaz-Maurin, [IAEA arrives at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant for its riskiest mission in history](#), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2 September 2022

Judy Asks: [Is NATO Doing Anything for Ukraine?](#) Carnegie Europe, 1 September 2022

[Forcible Transfer of Ukrainians to Russia: Punitive, Abusive Screening of Fleeing Civilians](#), Human Rights Watch, 1 September 2022

Henry Sokolski, [The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant Is Kindling for World War III](#), The National Interest, 31 August 2022

Eden Cole, [NATO's Defence and Security Sector Reform Challenges in Ukraine](#), Small Wars Journal, 31 August 2022

Connor Echols, [Pentagon stockpiles 'uncomfortably low' due to Ukraine arms transfers: DoD](#), Responsible Statecraft, 29 August 2022

Michael Dougherty, [NATO Is Getting More Unbalanced](#), National Review, 29 August 2022

[Russia is pulling all its fighter jets out of Crimea after a series of strikes on its military outposts there, secret NATO report says](#), Business Insider, 26 August 2022

[Russia can't stop war, even if Ukraine drops NATO hopes -Putin ally](#), Reuters, 26 August 2022

Shashank Joshi, [The War in Ukraine at the Half-Year Mark: How Has the Media Fared?](#) RUSI Commentary, 24 August 2022

Dan La Botz, [Ukraine: between hope and fear](#), Foreign Policy in Focus, 23 August 2022

Sidharth Kaushal, [Can Russia Continue to Fight a Long War?](#) RUSI Commentary, 23 August 2022

[The top brass and consultants steering Kyiv on the path to NATO](#), Intelligence Online (paywall), 22 August 2022

[As US Announces New \\$800M Ukraine Arms Package, Here's The Total List Since War's Start](#), Zero Hedge, 19 August 2022

On investigations of war crimes in Ukraine and other legal processes

The ICC in the Hague opened an investigation into possible war crimes in Ukraine just days after Moscow's forces invaded and it dispatched dozens of investigators to the country to gather evidence. On 14 July, 45 countries [agreed](#) at a conference in the Hague to coordinate investigations into suspected war crimes in Ukraine.

On the risk of nuclear war

After four weeks of meetings, the 10th Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference [ended without an agreement](#). Despite the final draft outcome document being significantly weakened throughout the negotiations by the nuclear-armed states, Russia refused to accept

the final version. A US state department [statement](#) dated 28 August said, “The Russian Federation alone decided to block consensus on a final document at the conclusion of the Tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Russia did so in order to block language that merely acknowledged the grave radiological risk at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine”. However, the accusations that that Russia was solely to blame for the failure of this Conference to reach consensus on an outcome does not hold up to the reality of the past month—or the past twelve years since the NPT’s states parties last agreed on substantive commitments in 2010. As Ray Acheson [argues](#), “The problem lies not with one state or group of states but with all the governments that prioritise their perception of power through violence over collective peace and well-being”. Meanwhile, the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko [said](#) on 26 August his country’s SU-24 combat aircraft have been re-fitted to carry nuclear armaments. Lukashenko added that he had previously agreed to the move with his Russian counterpart, Putin, and warned that his country was ready to respond to “serious provocation” from the west.

On sanctions against Russia and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine galvanized the US, UK and EU, and a handful of other Western-aligned countries, to unleash a series of sanctions meant to punish Vladimir Putin’s government and pressure him to pull his forces back. While the sanctions lists are sometimes difficult to interpret, the EU has [sanctioned](#) 1,158 individuals and 98 entities—an approximate doubling of its entire sanctions portfolio across the dozens of sanctions regimes it implements; the UK also roughly doubled its portfolio (excluding the UN listings it is obligated to implement) having [imposed](#) sanctions on over 1,000 individuals and over 100 businesses; and the US has [sanctioned](#) more than 1,000 individuals or organizations since the invasion. The numbers, and the pace of the rollout, dwarf the sanctions lists for the likes of Iran, North Korea, Libya, the thematic counterterrorism lists, and all others.

However, rather than dissuading the Kremlin as intended, the penalties appear instead to be exacerbating inflation, worsening food insecurity and punishing ordinary Russians more than Putin or his allies. Moreover, Russia has claimed (see NATO Watch [Update 17](#) and [Update 18](#)) that it is getting more revenue from its fossil fuel sales now than before its invasion of Ukraine, despite (or partly because of) Western sanctions.

Finance ministers from the Group of Seven (G7) nations [announced](#) on 2 September that they plan to implement a price cap on Russian oil. In a [statement](#), the ministers said the cap was designed to reduce “Russia’s ability to fund its war of aggression” and that they would “urgently work on the finalisation and implementation” of the measure, but left out key details of the plan. Prior to the G7 announcement, Russia [said](#) imposing the price cap would trigger Russian retaliation. Gazprom announced an indefinite shutdown of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline on 2 September (see below).

On 31 August, the EU [agreed](#) to suspend a visa travel deal with Moscow to curb the number of Russian nationals entering the bloc for holidays and shopping, stopping short of a full tourist visa ban. Meeting in Prague, the EU’s 27 foreign ministers promised to suspend the 2007 visa facilitation agreement with Russia that makes it relatively easy to obtain travel documents. The EU move will make getting travel documents significantly more complicated and expensive. The EU foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, had previously [said](#) a total ban would lack the necessary support. “I don’t think that to cut the relationship with the Russian civilian population will help and I don’t think that this idea will have the required unanimity,” he told Austrian TV on 28 August.

On 29 August more Western technology companies, including Ericsson and Nokia [announced](#) plans for complete exits from Russia, following Dell’s withdrawal last week. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan, a neighbour and ally of Russia, suspended all arms exports for a year, its government [said](#) on 27 August. The reasons for the decision and its likely impact are unclear.

On international food security and Ukrainian grain exports

The [announcement](#) on 22 July of a grain deal between Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the UN – which could allow Ukraine to export up to 22 million tons of grain stuck in its ports via the Black Sea – was a rare ray of light. The resumption of food exports could prove crucial for Ukraine's economy as well as global food but will rely on a fragile truce in the Black Sea security (on international food security and Ukrainian grain exports, see NATO Watch [Update 17](#), [Update 18](#), [Update 20](#) and [Update 21](#)). The resumption of grain exports is being overseen by a Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul where Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and UN personnel are working. Meanwhile, in the midst of global economic repression, the food market [appears](#) to have stabilised, partly due to UN efforts to restart Ukrainian exports and increased Russian production.

On energy security in Europe

Gas shortages across Europe are likely to last for several winters, the chief executive of Shell, Ben van Beurden, [said](#) during a press conference in Norway on 29 August, raising the prospect of continued energy rationing as governments push to develop alternative supplies. The West accuses Russia of restricting energy supplies to boost prices in retaliation for sanctions imposed after Moscow's invasion of Ukraine. For example, the head of the UK's energy regulator, Ofgem, [blamed](#) Russia for driving up energy prices, resulting in the UK price cap rising by 80%. Russia denies it is to blame and attributes responsibility to Western sanctions and various technical problems.

Russia [stopped](#) the flow of gas via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline to Europe on 31 August, citing the need to carry out repairs. The German government rejected the claim, calling it a "pretence". It said Nord Stream was "fully operational" and that there were no technical issues. Although the stoppage was due to last for three days, the Russian energy company Gazprom [announced](#) on 2 September that it would not restart on schedule the next day, citing turbine damage. Gazprom's CEO, Alexei

Miller, indicated that Siemens could not carry out repairs because of sanctions. European Commission spokesman Eric Mamer said Gazprom was staging the shutdown "under fallacious pretences". No timeframe for reopening the pipeline has been given, and the decision coincided with the G7 announcement of a price cap on Russian oil (see above).

Earlier in the week, the wholesale price of gas [dropped](#) sharply in a rare respite from recent highs on signs that Europe is preparing to intervene directly in energy markets. The European Commission said it was working "flat out" on an emergency package, and on a longer-term "structural reform of the electricity market" to combat soaring prices while efforts to fill gas storage facilities appear to be ahead of schedule. The day-ahead UK wholesale gas price fell by more than 20% to 447p per therm on 30 August, while the month-ahead contract dropped by a quarter, to 473p per therm. Germany is replenishing its gas stocks more quickly than expected despite drastic Russian supply cuts and should meet an October target early, the government has [said](#). Europe's largest economy is heavily dependent on Russian gas and has sought to increase its reserves before winter, crediting energy-saving measures in recent weeks and massive purchases of gas from other suppliers.

Sweden has [said](#) it would provide liquidity guarantees to Nordic and Baltic energy companies worth "billions of dollars" in an effort to prevent a financial crisis sparked by Europe's energy crunch. Meanwhile, the BBC [reported](#) that Russia is burning off large amounts of natural gas that it would previously have exported to Germany while energy costs soar in Europe. Citing an analysis by Rystad Energy, a plant near Russia's border with Finland is reportedly burning an estimated £8.4 million worth of gas every day.

Joseph Fraley, [Renewable Energy in Ukraine: A Solution for European Energy Security and for Shifting the EU GND Eastward](#), Globsec Commentary, 26 August 2022

On developments within Ukraine

On 1 September children [returned to Ukrainian schools](#) damaged by occupying Russian forces. Only schools that are fit for use, are in areas that do not face a regular threat of shelling and that have enough students opt for in-person teaching will reopen. School administrations have been preparing for the new academic year by outfitting basements as shelters and training teachers on what to do in case of an attack.

On 26 August Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk [announced](#) plans to expand mandatory evacuations for civilians living on the war's frontlines. Speaking on national television, she said evacuating women with children and elderly people would be a priority from some districts of the eastern Kharkiv region, and the southern Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv regions.

Ukrainians are likely to experience their coldest winter in decades, Yuri Vitrenko, the head of the state gas company Naftogaz, [said](#), with the thermostats on its Soviet-era centralised heating systems due to be switched on later and turned down. Vitrenko said indoor temperatures would be set at between 17-18C, about four degrees lower than normal, and he advised people to stock up on blankets and warm clothes for when outdoor temperatures fall to and beyond the -10C winter average.

Ukraine's parliament endorsed several laws and ratifications on 30 August to bring the country closer to the EU. President Zelenskiy [said](#) "we are moving step by step towards full membership in the EU". Meanwhile, the UN's cultural agency, UNESCO, [said](#) it supports a bid by Ukraine to put its port city of Odesa on the world heritage list of protected sites.

On developments within Russia

The last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, [died in Moscow aged 91](#) on 30 August. Gorbachev's reforms led to the unlooked-for break-up of his own country, and to the demise of communism across central and eastern Europe. President Putin, a longtime KGB intelligence officer who called the Soviet Union's collapse a

"geopolitical catastrophe", denied Gorbachev a full state funeral ceremony. Putin also [said](#) he was too busy to attend.

Russia is reportedly struggling to find more soldiers to fight in Ukraine and has expanded recruitment efforts by eliminating the upper age limit and by tapping into prisons. "Many of these new recruits have been observed as older, unfit and ill-trained," a Pentagon official [told](#) journalists on 29 August. Two days later another US official [briefed](#) that Russia is seeking to recruit contract service members and may even draw in convicted criminals to make up for personnel shortages, "including by compelling wounded soldiers to re-enter combat, acquiring personnel from private security companies, and paying bonuses to conscripts". President Putin [signed a decree](#) last week that the Russian army would increase by about 10%, to 1.15 million service personnel, starting January 2023.

The chairman of Russia's second-largest oil company, Ravil Maganov, [died](#) on 1 September after allegedly falling out of the window of a hospital in Moscow where he was receiving medical treatment for a heart attack. Maganov's company, Lukoil, is the only Russian oil producer to have publicly called for the termination of the war in Ukraine. Maganov is at least the sixth Russian oil or gas executive to have died this year under seemingly mysterious circumstances. Meanwhile, Russia's FSB security service [accused](#) without evidence a second Ukrainian citizen of acquiring fake documents and preparing the car bomb that [killed](#) Darya Dugina, the daughter of an ultranationalist Russian, last month.

On China's position on the war

China has refused to condemn Russia's invasion and its president, Xi Jinping, told Putin it would support Russia's "sovereignty and security". NATO's new [Strategic Concept](#) asserts that there is a "deepening strategic partnership" between China and Russia. On 1 September Russia and China [launched large-scale military exercises](#) involving several allied nations in a show of growing defence

cooperation. The Russian defence ministry said the Vostok 2022 (East 2022) exercise would be held until 7 September in Russia's far east and the Sea of Japan and involve more than 50,000 troops and 5,000 weapons units, including 140 aircraft and 60 warships.

Sarang Shidore, [Vostok military exercises indicate that Russia is far from isolated](#), Responsible Statecraft, 1 September 2022

On developments within NATO

Poland and the Czech Republic [agreed](#) to protect the airspace of their NATO ally Slovakia, as it upgrades its air force from legacy Soviet-made MiG-29 fighters to a new batch of F-16 combat aircraft from the USA. The protection agreement signed on 27 August is scheduled to run until Slovakia receives the aircraft sometime in 2024.

Two intra-NATO tensions returned to the fore this week. First, the long-running tensions between Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean led to a war of words. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 30 August [criticised](#) Greece over the alleged harassment of Turkish jets carrying out reconnaissance missions over the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, calling it a "hostile act", adding "Greece can neither match up to us nor become an interlocutor for us politically, economically or militarily". Turkey has often criticized NATO, including the US, for not supporting it enough on its territorial dispute with Greece on islands in the Aegean and the issue of exploration of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece rejected the Turkish version of events, and said five Turkish jets appeared without prior notification to accompany a flight of US B-52 bombers – which hadn't been due to have a fighter escort – through an area subject to Greek flight control. Meanwhile, a tweet by NATO's Allied Land Command congratulating Turkey on its Victory Day was quickly [deleted](#) this week, following a protest through diplomatic channels by Greece, which has a different take on the history. Victory Day in Turkey also known as Turkish Armed Forces Day commemorates the decisive victory in the Battle of Dumlupinar,

the last battle in the Greco-Turkish War, on 30 August 1922.

Second, Poland [announced](#) on 1 September it will demand from Germany 1.3 trillion euros in reparations for World War II. In a news conference, government officials argued that Poland has never been fully compensated for what it suffered during the Nazi German invasion and five-year occupation. In prior Polish calls for such reparations, German officials have argued that sufficient compensation was provided to Poland in the [redrawing](#) of Europe's borders following the end of the war.

Dan Lohrmann, [NATO Countries Hit With Unprecedented Cyber Attacks](#), Government Technology, 4 September 2022

[Tens of thousands protest in Prague against Czech government, EU and NATO](#), Reuters, 3 September 2022

[Greece has no real value in NATO: President Erdoğan](#), Daily Sabah, 2 September 2022

[Ransomware Attack Sends Montenegro Reaching Out to NATO Partners](#), Bloomberg, 1 September 2022

[NATO takes down Turkish tweet after Greek gripe](#), Kathimerini, 1 September 2022

Willy Rock, [Why the Su-57 will never be a major threat to NATO](#), Royal Blue, 31 August 2022

[New lives for Afghans who worked with NATO](#), NATO News Release, 31 August 2022

[Ankara says Greece challenged NATO, allies by intercepting Turkish jets](#), Anadolu Agency, 30 August 2022

[NATO ships concludes Alexandria port visit and naval exercise with Egyptian navy](#), NATO News Release, 29 August 2022

Elizabeth Montalbano, [NATO Investigates Dark Web Leak of Data Stolen from Missile Vendor](#), Dark Reading, 29 August 2022

[B-52S brought under NATO command for the first time during mission over Romania](#), NATO News Release, 29 August 2022

[UK's defective Nato flagship could miss 'landmark' flight trials](#), The Guardian, 29 August 2022

[Irish public split on NATO membership](#), Euractiv, 29 August 2022

Seth Robson, [Key NATO allies show commitment to Indo-Pacific with fighter deployments](#), Stars and Stripes, 29 August 2022

[NATO must expand presence in Arctic, says Stoltenberg](#), Deutsche Welle, 28 August 2022

[Joint press conference](#) with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, 26 August 2022

[NATO Secretary-General warns of 'significant Russian military buildup' in the High North](#), Globe and Mail, 26 August 2022

[NATO chief warns Canada that Russia, China have designs on the Arctic](#), CBC News, 26 August 2022

[Summit prepares ground for 'NATOisation of Europe' and continues collision course with China and high levels of military spending](#), NATO Watch Briefing No.96, 6 July 2022

On Finland and Sweden joining NATO

Finland and Sweden were invited to join NATO, after a [trilateral memorandum](#) with Turkey agreed on the eve of the NATO Madrid Summit assuaged Ankara's previous objections. The two Nordic countries will become NATO members after the Accession Protocol is ratified by all 30 member states. The invitation to Finland and Sweden represents a major geopolitical shift in Europe as the two countries move away from neutrality. However, ratification by Turkey is still by no means certain. The trilateral agreement could still falter on implementation, especially regarding Turkish extradition requests. To date, 23 NATO member states have ratified the decision, with the USA the most recent to do so. The Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Turkey are the seven member states where parliaments have not yet been asked to vote on Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO.

Eddie Ryan, [NATO expansion harms Kurds](#), Daily Illini, 2 September 2022

[Chair of NATO Military Committee visits Sweden](#), NATO News Release, 2 September 2022

Çiğdem Üstün, [Understanding Türkiye's Opposition to Sweden and Finland's NATO Membership](#), Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2 September 2022

[Danish defense minister: New status quo will 'move NATO to the north,' with Baltic emphasis](#), Breaking Defense, 1 September 2022

[Commander Joint Force Command Brunssum Visits Sweden, Finland and Norway](#), NATO News Release, 30 August 2022

[Sweden's NATO talks with Türkiye strained by party members posing with PKK/YPG flags: Foreign Minister](#), AA, 29 August 2022

Michael Jonsson and Robin Häggblom, [Cooperation can make the NATO lake a reality](#), War On The Rocks, 29 August 2022

[Turkey, Sweden, Finland to hold new round of talks on Nordics' NATO bid in fall](#), Helsinki Times, 28 August 2022

[NATO: Sweden, Finland, Turkey meet over accession bids](#), Deutsche Welle, 26 August 2022

For further details see:

[Murky trilateral agreement results in Turkey lifting objections to Finland and Sweden's NATO application](#), NATO Watch News Brief, 29 June 2022

[Should Finland and Sweden hold a referendum on NATO membership?](#) NATO Watch Briefing no. 93, 6 May 2022

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