The promise of UNTAP

Our 2 July post outlined our proposal for a UN Transitional Administration for Palestine with a mandate to provide interim governance and security throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, arguing that:

The UNTAP model delivers on three fundamental elements: (1) post-occupation security for both Israel and Palestine; (2) a viable, democratic negotiating path to Palestinian self-determination; and (3) a new status quo where negotiation is the only way forward.

This is the first of four posts elaborating further on our initial outline. Here we will provide more insight into the East Timorese experience with this mechanism.

The second post will discuss how that model might best be adapted to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

The third post will focus on how a UN Transitional Administration for Palestine (UNTAP) reconciles the US view of Israel’s “right to security” within the two-state solution negotiating framework with the requirements of international law, particularly the requirement for Israel to end its illegal occupation as rapidly as possible.

The fourth post examines how we get from here to there — how we move from an UNTAP proposal to an UNTAP reality, and the key role of Western allies of the US in making this happen.

The East Timorese experience

Occupied by Portugal since the 16^th century, East Timor was then invaded and purportedly annexed by Indonesia in 1976, following the rise of an independence movement and the retreat of Portugal. With the election of a democratic government in Indonesia in 1998, the UN spearheaded an agreement with both the occupying power, Indonesia, and the former colonial power, Portugal, to hold a referendum in East Timor on its future status and then organized and oversaw the vote, wherein 78.5% of ballots cast rejected “autonomy” within Indonesia in favour of independence.

While a UN mission, UNAMET, was authorized to carry out the referendum, responsibility for security rested with the Indonesian government, with dire results.

With the precipitous withdrawal after the vote of the entire Indonesian civilian government and a murderous campaign by pro-Indonesian militias against the East Timorese civilian population, aided by segments of the Indonesian military, an agreement was reached for, and the UN Security Council then authorized, the establishment of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Its role was to provide essential security and governance structures for East Timor, as well as to build local capacity for self-government, with the ultimate objective being the development of a new constitution, elections and the emergence of a new country, Timor Leste.

UNTAET mandate from the UN Security Council

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council authorized UNTAET:

• To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;
• To establish an effective administration;
• To assist in the development of civil and social services;
• To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance;
• To support capacity-building for self-government (which included in turn, to plan, organize and hold elections); and
• To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.

The Security Council mandate was based on a report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council, which in turn reflected agreements with Indonesia and Portugal and the results of the “popular consultation” (East Timor referendum), organized by UNAMET. It also included inputs from all relevant parts of the UN, including political affairs, humanitarian operations, and the then Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (now DPO); it provided the “framework and concept of operations” of the proposed mission mandate and how the mission should be organized and staffed to fulfill its mandate, once authorized by the UN Security Council.

Further to the above-noted report of then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, UNTAET was organized into five big operational areas of governance and public administration, under the overall authority of the UN Transitional Administrator, Brazilian UN diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello:

Judicial Affairs; Civilian Police; Economic, Financial and Development Affairs; Public Services; and Electoral Operations as well as oversight of District Administrators. – Report of the UN Secretary-General at paragraphs 50–72

Involvement of East Timorese in governance by UNTAET

In December 1999, Transitional Administrator Vieira de Mello, in consultation with East Timorese political and community leaders, established the National Consultative Council (NCC), composed of East Timorese political and community leaders, as well as UNTAET members to advise the Transitional Administrator.

By July 2000 it had become a National Council, representing the main political parties and religious communities of East Timor. In August 2000 a Transitional Cabinet was formed. Pursuant to its mandate, UNTAET gradually integrated East Timorese into all major decision-making areas within the administration. (See paragraphs 16 -17 of the Secretary-General’s Report to the UN Security Council of 16 January 2001 for more details.)

Elections for an 88-member Constituent Assembly were held on 30 August 2001, and that body completed its work on a draft constitution, proclaimed in force in March 2002.

Presidential elections in April 2002 elected former independence leader Xanana Gusmao as the future president of an independent East Timor.

Timor Leste became an independent country on 20 May 2002. Simultaneously, the mandate of UNTAET expired, the UN Security Council having authorized its successor mission, UNMISET, three days earlier, on 17 May 2002.

UNTAET was supported by a “robust” multinational security force INTERFET – until its military peacekeepers could deploy

The deployment of UN peacekeepers can take three months or more since the UN has no standing force and has to negotiate with member states for the provision of the military and police components of its missions.

Given the deterioration in the security situation in East Timor, putting East Timorese civilians at grave risk, the UN Security Council authorized a non-UN-led multinational intervention force – INTERFET (Intervention Force in East Timor) to provide security pending the full deployment of the UN military contingents. Led by Australia, a well-respected peacekeeping nation, the 11,000-strong force had wide regional representation, including from Southeast Asia and the Middle East, as well as from countries with a strong peacekeeping tradition, including Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom.

Deeply concerned by the deterioration in the security situation in East Timor, and in particular by the continuing violence against and large-scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians – UN SCR 1264 (1999)

Authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to “take all necessary means” to carry out its mandate to “restore peace and security” and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, it is described in the “bible” of UN peacekeeping, The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2015 edition at page 648), as a

proxy for a robust UN Peace operation with clear enforcement powers.

UNTAET military component was also a robust peacekeeping force

To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor – UNTAET security mandate from SCR 1272 (25 October 1999)

The military component of UNTAET, which took several months to fully deploy, was also authorized under Chapter VII “to use all necessary means” in fulfillment of its mandate to provide security in East Timor, while its police component had executive (operational) policing authority “to maintain law and order” as well as a training component to assist in the development of local law enforcement capacity.

(For more detail on the UNTAET military tasks, see paragraph 75 of the report of the UN Secretary-General of 26 January 2000.)

Withdrawal of Indonesian forces, disarming militias and cantonment of independence forces

An important component of the peace restoration/security mandate of both INTERFET and the UNTAET military component was to verify the withdrawal of all Indonesian forces from East Timor, the majority of whom had withdrawn before the arrival of either force.  The military components were also responsible for disarming the pro-Indonesian militias and the cantonment and disarmament of the guerrilla/independence forces. Ultimately, the disarmament aspect of the cantoned forces was limited to the confinement of the weapons to the cantonment areas.

UNTAET was replaced by a multidimensional UN PKO (UNMISET) following Timor Leste independence

As discussed above, the mandate of the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) ended with the emergence of the independent state of  Timor Leste on 20 May 2002.

However, in light of ongoing challenges to the short- and long-term security and political stability/viability of an independent East Timor, on 17 May 2002, the UN Security Council authorized a follow-on mission, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), with the following mandate:

• To provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor;
• To provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service (ETPS);
• To contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor.

UNTAET and the creation of an East Timorese National Defence Force

While it was not initially envisaged that East Timor would have a national defence force, given its limited resources, once the UN Transitional Authority was up and running, key East Timorese leaders decided that such a force was a

necessary element in the transition to independence so that East Timor is able to guard its borders when the UN mission leaves.  – para 58 of July 2000 Report of the UN Secretary-General

Following an independent study with financial support from the UK, the transitional Cabinet recommended its establishment, leading in turn to the promulgation of a regulation by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General On the Establishment of a Defence Force for East Timor.

UNTAET then consulted with interested governments on how the new force might best be set up, and Australia and Portugal pledged significant support and undertook to play a leading role in this effort.

In September 2000, with former Falintil veterans at its core, a 3,000-strong East Timor Defence Force was formed. Falintil was the armed wing of the main East Timor independence movement (see Oxford Handbook, p. 652).

Division of labour between bilateral partners and UNTAET regarding defence force

While it was part of UNTAET’s remit to decide on the establishment of the force and on its governing principles, set out in the regulation referenced above, the actual establishment of the force and the training of prospective members was properly a matter of bilateral assistance from, in this case, Australia, Portugal, and the UK, among others.

Consolidation of peace, democracy and development is a long-term project

Subsequent UN missions and offices continued to provide assistance and support to Timor Leste until the closure of UNMIT on 31 December 2012, underscoring the reality that consolidating peace, democracy and development in post-colonial, post-conflict societies is a long-term project.

Our next post will discuss how a UN transitional administration might best be adapted to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

FOREIGN MINISTER JOLY SAYS CANADA NOW PROHIBITS ALL ARMS AND COMPONENTS TO GAZA WAR

We will not have any form of arms or parts of arms be sent to Gaza. Period. – FM Joly on 10 September 2024

In our 6 September post, we highlighted a Canadian civil society joint letter calling on the Government of Canada to end all Canadian arms transfers to Israel, including those being exported under existing permits and indirect transfers to Israel via the US.

In March, the Liberals joined the NDP to pass a motion to stop authorizing arms exports to Israel, though permits approved prior to January 2024 remained active as did indirect transfers via the United States.

I suspended this summer around 30 existing permits of Canadian companies… – FM Joly, 10 September 2024

However, on 10 September in a press conference at the Liberal caucus retreat in Nanaimo, B.C., Foreign Minister Joly announced that this summer she had suspended about 30 existing permits that had been issued before January to ship military goods to Israel.

She further stated that Canada will not allow the sale of ammunition through the United States to Israel. The ammunition was to have been produced by a Quebec division of US defence contractor General Dynamics.

The joint civil society letter had specifically referenced this contract of “high explosive mortar cartridges and related equipment”.

In the Minister’s words:

As for the question regarding General Dynamics, our policy is clear. We will not have any form of arms, or parts of arms, be sent to Gaza. Period. How they’re being sent and where they’re being sent is irrelevant. And so therefore my position is clear, the position of the government is clear, and we’re in contact with General Dynamics.

Kelsey Gallagher of Project Ploughshares, a signatory organization to the joint letter,  told the Globe and Mail:

It is welcome news that Canada has taken a step further by suspending existing arms export permits, which is the only sensible step forward to ensure Canadian weapon systems are not being used in the conflict in Gaza….

When explosive weapons are used in populated areas, like those tied to this contract, typically nine out of ten casualties are civilians.

Canada must make clear that F-35 components are also part of the Canadian ban

There remains, however, a lack of clarity on whether Canada has stopped its shipment of parts for US-made F-35 warplanes that are then sold to the Israeli military.

As Kelsey Gallagher explained to the Globe and Mail:

Canadian officials must be clear that any and all potential arms transfers through the U.S. to Israel will be disallowed. This does not just include mortar rounds made in Quebec, but also Israel-destined F-35 components that are produced coast to coast.

Extensive media coverage referenced joint civil society call for total arms ban

Major civil-society groups have called on Ottawa to expand restrictions on military exports to Israel to a total ban. – Dylan Robertson, The Canadian Press in CP24.com (10 September 2024)

There was extensive media coverage of Foreign Minister Joly’s welcome announcement of the expansion of Canada’s ban on arms exports for use in Gaza, including by the CBC, CTV, CP24, and the Toronto Star.

All referenced the civil society call contained in the joint letter, which is now open for additional signatures by civil society organizations who had not signed on by the original deadline.

For a compelling article on the importance of a total ban, see Why Canadian Aid Groups are Calling for an Israel Arms Embargo (Alex Cosh, readthemaple.com, 10 September 2024).

Whither Canada?

We applaud the 10 September 2024 announcement of a further expansion of Canada’s ban on arms exports to Israel to cover existing permits and indirect transfers of arms and components.  However, further clarity is still needed, particularly regarding Canadian-made components exported to the US for integration into the Israeli F-35I Joint Strike Fighter.

We call on the Government of Canada to issue a written statement that Canada now bans all potential arms transfers to Israel for use in Gaza whether under existing or proposed permits, whether relating to arms or components and whether shipped directly to Israel or via the US or another country, including Israel-destined F-35 components.

TO STOP THE GAZA WAR, CONTINUED DIRECT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA FROM CANADIAN CITIZENS IS ESSENTIAL AND EFFECTIVE.

CLICK HERE  FOR LINKS TO GOVERNMENT MINISTERS AND OPPOSITION CRITICS AND YOUR LOCAL MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT.

Photo credits: Wikimedia Commons (Timor Leste postage stamp); Wikimedia Commons, Maj Ofer (Israeli Adir F35 fighter jet); UNRWA (Gaza bombing).

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